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Abstract
The objective of this thesis is to examine cross-border contagion effects during
the 2007-09 crisis in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and from all the possible
propagation channels, it chooses to focus on cross-border bank loans. It tries to
discover which global and local factors had significant influence on the changes
in bank loans from banks in source (lending) countries to banks, as well as
households, corporations and government in host (borrowing) countries. The
main research method is a panel data regression model.
The empirical results suggest that both local and global factors had influ-
ence on the changes in cross-border loans, i.e. helped to spread the 2007-09
crisis to CEE. The significant local factors were macroeconomic and financial
characteristics of both source and host countries, such as their GDP growth dif-
ferential, interest rate differential, FDI, or profitability and health of the banking
sector. The significant global factors were the expected market volatility and
investors’ risk appetite/aversion which was an indicator of “pure” contagion.
The main contribution of this thesis lies in its focus on CEE and the analysis
of investors’ behavior based on their changing risk appetite.
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Abstrakt
C´ılem te´to diplomove´ pra´ce je prozkoumat efekt prˇeshranicˇn´ı financˇn´ı na´kazy
beˇhem krize 2007-09 ve strˇedn´ı a vy´chodn´ı Evropeˇ (SVE) a ze vsˇech mech-
anismu˚ sˇ´ıˇren´ı se zameˇrˇuje na mezina´rodn´ı bankovn´ı p˚ujcˇky. Pokousˇ´ı se zjis-
tit, jake´ globa´ln´ı a loka´ln´ı faktory meˇly vy´znamny´ vliv na zmeˇny ve velikosti
bankovn´ıch p˚ujcˇek ze zdrojovy´ch (veˇrˇitelsky´ch) zemı´ banka´m, doma´cnostem,
podnik˚um a vla´da´m v prˇij´ımaj´ıc´ıch (dluzˇny´ch) zemı´ch. Jako hlavn´ı vy´zkumna´
metoda je pouzˇita´ panelova´ regrese.
Empiricke´ vy´sledky naznacˇuj´ı, zˇe jak loka´ln´ı, tak globa´ln´ı faktory meˇly
vliv na zmeˇny v toku mezina´rodn´ıch bankovn´ıch p˚ujcˇek, a tedy napomohly
k rozsˇ´ıˇren´ı krize 2007-09 do SVE. Vy´znamne´ loka´ln´ı faktory byly makroeko-
nomicke´ a financˇn´ı charakteristiky veˇrˇitelsky´ch i dluzˇny´ch zemı´, jako naprˇ´ıklad
rozd´ıl v r˚ustu jejich HDP, rozd´ıl v u´rokovy´ch mı´ra´ch, prˇ´ıme´ zahrancˇn´ı inves-
tice, cˇi ziskovost a zdrav´ı bankovn´ıho sektoru. Vy´znamne´ globa´ln´ı faktory byly
ocˇka´vana´ trzˇn´ı volatilita a averze/apetit k riziku sveˇtovy´ch investor˚u, ktery´
slouzˇil jako ukazatel “cˇiste´” na´kazy. Hlavn´ı prˇ´ınos te´to pra´ce spocˇ´ıva´ v jej´ım
zameˇrˇen´ı na SVE a v analy´ze chova´n´ı investor˚u v za´vislosti na jejich meˇn´ıc´ı se
averzi k riziku.
Klasifikace JEL F34, G11, G14, G15, G21
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The financial markets all around the world have become significantly intercon-
nected during the past few decades and this fact has had an important effect on
the global transmission mechanisms of economic shocks. A financial crisis that
originates in one country can be spread very fast to other countries through
various channels, such as international stock exchanges, trading of financial
instruments or international bank loans.
The principle which helps a financial crisis spread across borders, the so-
called cross-border or financial contagion, has awoken interest of many economists
during the last two decades. One of the first to have noticed the contagion
phenomenon was Eichengreen et al. (1996) who examined clusters of currency
crises, such as the ERM or Mexican crises of the early 1990s. Since then, more
evidence of cross-border contagion has appeared - starting with the Asian or
Russian crises and finishing with the latest 2007-09 financial crisis.
Cross-border contagion plays an important role in analyzing the global econ-
omy in times of financial turmoils, however there are various opinions on the
mechanisms through which it works. Masson (1998) or Kumar & Persaud
(2002) define two main categories of contagion: pure contagion and spillovers.
Pure contagion refers to the transmission of crises that cannot be explained
by changes of fundamentals or by any direct linkages and spillovers between
the affected countries. Others divide the spillovers further to spillovers via
trade (Eichengreen et al. 1996; Glick & Rose 1999) and via financial linkages
(Van Rijckeghem & Weder 2001). Herrmann & Mihaljek (2010) divide the
factors causing contagion in two main groups - local and global, depending
on whether they are linked to a specific country or are common to the whole
world’s economy.
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The objective of this thesis is to examine the contagion effects during the
2007-09 crisis in CEE and from all the possible propagation channels, it chooses
to focus on cross-border bank loans. The integration to international financial
markets caused by a massive inflow of foreign capital is quite a new experience
for the CEE countries. The share of foreign owned banks has increased signif-
icantly since the fall of communism, people and legal entities can take credit
from foreign banks or their local subsidiaries and non-residents hold significant
amounts of government and corporate bonds and shares of local companies.
This of course brings many advantages, such as easier access to financing, but
on the other hand makes the countries much more vulnerable to financial tur-
bulences in the rest of the world. Therefore we have chosen CEE as a good
example of a region affected by the cross-border contagion effects.
The financial integration process together with the fact that one of the
main symptoms of the 2007-09 financial crisis was the so-called “credit crunch”
(reduction in the general availability of loans) make us believe that cross-border
loans were one of the most important transmission mechanisms of the 2007-
09 financial crisis to CEE (see e.g. Nikolov (2010)). International lending to
all sectors in CEE decreased substantially in the third quarter of 2008 and
continued to drop until the end of 2009. The lack of funding then caused a
significant contraction of the real economy and helped to spread the 2007-09
crisis in the region.
The main question to be answered in this thesis is what global and local
factors influenced the cuts in cross-border bank loans in the CEE countries, i.e.
helped to spread the 2007-09 financial crisis. The empirical research is based on
a panel data reregression model. The data sample covers the Czech Republic,
Slovakia, Poland, Hungary, Slovenia, Croatia, Bulgaria and Romania, which
are examined as the “host” (borrowing) countries. Some literature on the CEE
region, such as Gersˇl (2007), focuses also on the Baltic states - Latvia, Lithuania
and Estonia. However, these countries are known for a high share of banking
sector owned by the Scandinavian countries and thus do not fit to our group
of 5 “source” (lending) countries which is Austria, Germany, France, Italy and
Belgium. These countries were chosen mainly for the presence of big banking
groups across the CEE region, such as Austrian Erste Bank and Raiffeisen,
French Societe Generale, Belgian KBC, Italian UniCredit or German Deutsche
Bank and Commerzbank.
The local factors examined by our model are domestic macroeconomic fun-
damentals and banking sector characteristics of both source and host countries.
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The global factors are the expected short-term volatility on global financial
markets and, more importantly, investors’ risk aversion which controls for the
pure contagion effect. The change in investors’ “risk appetite” is calculated
according to Kumar & Persaud (2002) and is usually caused by the herding
effect of international investors, not necessarily based on rational decisions.
We believe that many CEE countries (especially the ones with relatively sound
economies such as the Czech Republic or Poland) have suffered severe losses
because they were put together with all the “risky” CEE countries without
any deeper analysis of their specific characteristics.“Risky” in this case means
mainly the high amount of debts in foreign currency which can through de-
valuation threaten the domestic economy (people are unable to roll over their
debts that have suddenly increased in value) and was for instance one of the
main causes of the crisis in Hungary.
The thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 2 provides an overview of the
existing literature on cross-border contagion and explains all necessary terms
and theories. Chapter 3 describes the causes and consequences of the 2007-
09 financial crisis globally, as well as with focus on the CEE region which is
put into both European and developed countries’ context. Chapter 4 provides
an empirical analysis of the cross-border contagion in CEE during the 2007-09
crisis. It is based on a panel regression model with change of cross-border loans
as dependent variable and various global and local factors of source and host
countries as explanatory variables. The chapter describes the model choice and
its methodology, the examined data, hypotheses and assumptions, interprets
the estimation results and in the end shows some robustness checks. Chapter
5 summarizes our findings.
Chapter 2
Theoretical Background
The principle of cross-border contagion and spillovers of a financial crisis from
one country to another has awakened the interest of economists due to the
events on financial markets in 1990s. The debates started because of the ERM
crisis in 1992-93 and intensified during the Mexican “Tequilla crisis” in 1994-95
and the Asian, Russian and LTCM crises of 1997-98 (Kumar & Persaud 2002).
A key text in this case was the analysis by Eichengreen et al. (1996) which
discovered that according to a widely accepted definition of a currency crisis,
48 out of 58 analyzed crises have occurred in a cluster of two or more. That
led the authors to a definition of contagion as a case where attacks on other
currencies (i.e. currency crises) increase the probability of a home currency
crisis, which is an effect beyond the domestic fundamentals. However, this is
only one unique definition of cross-border contagion and there is no universal
one in the existing literature.
2.1 Pure Contagion vs. Spillovers
Masson (1998) or Kumar & Persaud (2002) define two main categories of conta-
gion: pure contagion and spillovers. Pure contagion refers to the transmission
of crises that cannot be explained by changes of fundamentals or by any direct
linkages and spillovers between the affected countries. It is not easily mea-
sured nor well defined and in the existing empirical literature often remains
as residual when all other fundamental variables are accounted for. Kumar &
Persaud (2002) define it as a change in investors’ appetite for, or aversion to,
risk. An example of this form of contagion could be when a shock in one coun-
try leads investors to change their perception of risks in countries with similar
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macroeconomic fundamentals (such as the CEE region), not caring too much
about whether the similarities are real or just apparent. The literature on this
category of cross-border contagion could embody also the works that look at
co-movements of asset prices in different countries and use various econometric
techniques to find out whether there is any causality between them (Baig &
Goldfajn 1999; Bae et al. 2003).
The other category of contagion, spillovers, is caused by “real” inter-linkages
between the affected economies - often also called fundamentals-based conta-
gion. This category of contagion can be explained solely by the fact that the
affected country is linked to others via trade (e.g. import or export) or finance
(e.g. bank lending). It is important to say that the pure contagion as defined
by Kumar & Persaud (2002) serves as an additional or underlying factor to
the fundamental-based contagion and these two transmission channels do not
exclude each other.
2.1.1 Pure Contagion
According to Kumar & Persaud (2002), investors under pure contagion share a
common but changing risk appetite. It is changing in the way that the investors
are either risk-averse or risk-loving. When their appetite for risk decreases, they
restrict their exposure to risky assets whose prices consequently fall down. On
the other hand, when the investors’ appetite for risk increases, their demand
for risky assets increases as well and the assets’ value rises. Proof of this can
be seen in the fact that “strong” and “weak” periods have been similar for
perceived risky assets such as Brazilian bonds, Thai baht, South African rand
or United States (US) junk bonds even though Brazil, Thailand, South Africa
and US do not show many similarities in macroeconomic fundamentals. In their
work, Kumar & Persaud (2002) have developed an index which measures the
investor risk aversion and this index is going to be used as one of the variables
in our empirical model.
It is not always possible to say what was or will be the “wake-up call” to
cause the change in investors’ risk appetite. What makes the investors loose
interest in assets that they have until then considered suitable for their risk
profile? If we do not believe in the efficient markets theory, we can say that the
investors’ behavior can be influenced by their “bounded rationality”. They can
often have quite simple patterns that lead their investment decisions and an
unusual event or a series of events can put this pattern in question and make
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them change their perception of all assets’ riskiness. A world financial crisis
can be for sure accounted one of them.
The investors’ behavior considering pure contagion and change in risk ap-
petite is also sometimes referred to as the “herding behavior”. There are more
ways how to approach this phenomenon, described for instance in Kaminski
et al. (2003). One possible explanation of the herding behavior is through an
“information cascade” when an individual decides to follow the actions of those
ahead of them without considering his or her own information. Their logic goes
often so that if they join the crowd, they induce others to do the same and in
that case they are safe. It often happens that if the first few individuals join
the crowd, it triggers the whole process for the rest of investors.
Another theory concerning the herding behavior suggests that it can arise
even when investors are rational. The assumption for that is the presence of
information asymmetries, such as information costs. In cases where marginal
cost of gathering information exceeds marginal gain from the information, it is
rational for the investors to copy market portfolios and follow the crowd.
2.1.2 Spillovers: via Finance or Trade?
There are many works that discuss which is the most important transmission
channel for contagion - is it finance or trade? The earlier works such as Eichen-
green et al. (1996) or Glick & Rose (1999) assign a bigger importance to trade.
However, the sharp rise in cross-border capital flows versus cross-border trade
flows by the end of the 20th century suggests that the financial links could
play a bigger role in the transmission mechanisms of a crisis. Van Rijckeghem
& Weder (2001) present evidence that linkages through bank lending (i.e. fi-
nancial links) can help explain contagion better than trade linkages (namely
import and export) or country characteristics. They conduct their empirical
analysis on a dataset from the Mexican, Asian and Russian crises.
Eichengreen et al. (1996) or Glick & Rose (1999) describe the most direct
form of trade transmission channel which is through bilateral trade. If there is
a currency crisis in one country, the demand falls accordingly and the trading
partners with high levels of bilateral trade are affected. Another form of trade
links spillovers is more indirect and happens through competition in third mar-
kets. In this case, a currency crisis in one country that causes depreciation of
its exchange rate can negatively affect the countries that export to the same
markets.
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The spillovers through bank lending can be very often described by the
“common lender effect” and competition for funds that is also analyzed in
Van Rijckeghem & Weder (1999). It basically says that countries which are
exposed to the major lender of the primary crisis country are vulnerable to
contagion. Van Rijckeghem & Weder (1999) describe several mechanisms (pos-
sibly simultaneous) how “banking centers” can cause cross-border spillovers. If
the banks suffer losses in the “ground zero” country (where the currency crisis
has originated), it could lead them to sell off their assets in other countries in
order to restore their capital-adequacy ratio. Another mechanism is if investors
receive a margin call based on the decline in price in one asset and subsequently
decide to sell their assets in other countries. Considering the risk management
of most banks, if they face substantial losses or a rise in non-performing loans
in one country, they are likely to try to reduce their overall value at risk. The
usual procedure is to reduce the exposure in the riskiest markets or in credit
lines in historically correlated markets (Folkerts-Landau & Garber 1998).
The common creditor propagation mechanism of contagion is further de-
scribed also in Kaminski et al. (2003) or in Calvo et al. (2008). Kaminski et al.
(2003) focuses mainly on the “fast and furious contagion” examples, which were
for instance the Asian or Mexican crises. During these periods, the leveraged
common creditor played a major role. The data about cross-border lending
to the affected countries before and after the crises are self-explanatory. For
instance before the Asian crisis, European and Japanese banks’ lending to the
region peaked at USD 165 and USD 124 billion respectively and after the de-
valuation reversed to outflows of about USD 47 billion.
Besides the bank common creditors, Kaminski et al. (2003) also draw at-
tention to non-bank common creditors. Equity and bond flows also declined
sharply during the 1990s crises periods. This phenomenon helps to explain
among others the difficulties of Brazil, or Argentina during the Mexican cri-
sis. US-based mutual funds specialized in Latin America withdrew massively
from the region during the crisis which only worsened the situation, considering
that Brazil, Mexico and Argentina accounted all together for 77% of the Latin
American portfolio.
2.2 When Does Contagion Occur?
The Mexican, Asian and Russian crises were all characterized by very fast
propagation which Kaminski et al. (2003) call “fast and furious contagion”.
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The affected countries had to tackle declines in equity prices, value of their
currencies and national output and on the other hand sharp increases in cost of
borrowing associated with lower availability of international capital. However,
there are numerous examples of countries affected by a financial crisis which
never spread across their borders. For instance the devaluation of Brazilian
real in January 1999, or the default of the Convertibility Plan in Argentina in
December 2001. The question therefore is why cross-border financial contagion
occurs in some cases but not in others. What is so special about the shocks
or about the countries where they happen that it makes them spread across
borders?
Kaminski et al. (2003) come with an explanation called “the unholy trinity
of financial contagion”. They say that the cases where contagion occurs and
where it does not can be distinguished by three key elements - a sudden cut
of capital inflows, surprise announcements, and a leveraged common creditor.
The role of the first element is rather straightforward, as capital investment
is essential for good functioning and growth of any economy. It is further
examined for instance by Herrmann & Mihaljek (2010) who look at the cuts
of cross-border bank flows to emerging markets during the 2007-09 crisis or by
Hernandez et al. (2001) who look at the determinants of private capital flows
during the 1970s and 1990s.
The way of announcing the situation that triggers the whole crisis chain is
crucial for its further development. An unanticipated change does not allow in-
vestors pre-adjust their portfolios and their handling space shrinks to minimum
when the real crisis comes, leading to much more severe consequences. This
element is quite often connected to the herding behavior or pure contagion de-
scribed e.g. by Kumar & Persaud (2002). The third key element - a leveraged
common creditor - was present in all the crises with immediate international
influence and helped to propagate it across borders. It is quite often examined
by the economists in relation to cross-border contagion and it has already been
covered in a previous section of this work.
2.3 Lending to Emerging Markets
Despite the fact that most of the CEE countries examined in this work are
members of the Eurpean Union and their economic situation and standard of
life are often similar to average developed countries, they are still considered to
belong to the emerging markets. These markets have in general a big growth
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potential as the gap between their level and the level of the developed markets
is rather high. But they are also much more vulnerable to any shocks that
happen around the world because of their fragile institutional and economic
structure, set up in a shorter time than in the developed countries. Therefore
the contagion effect is highly relevant for them and many academic works an-
alyze the changes in international bank lending to these countries in times of
crisis, this work being no exception.
A rather recent example of such paper is written by McGuire & Tarashev
(2008) who examine the link between lending to emerging markets and health
of the global banking sector. They look at a period from early 1990s to 2007
and, similarly to our work, use the Bank for International Settlements (BIS)
international banking statistics for their empirical research. One of their most
important findings was that the deterioration in banks’ health and the situation
of developed interbank markets during the examined period consistently led to
slower growth in international credit to emerging markets. On the other hand,
locally extended credit did not show any signs of sensitivity to changes in
creditor banks’ health.
McGuire & Tarashev (2008) also examined the crisis period of mid-2007 to
mid-2008 and according to their findings, the lending to emerging markets held
up relatively well - on higher than expected level from the historical data anal-
ysis. However, the fall of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 was a breaking
point in the latest financial crisis which made the banks change their credit
policy from day to day. Therefore we expect that our work will bring some
more pessimistic findings about the lending to emerging markets during the
later stage of the crisis.
During the two big crisis episodes during 1990s (Mexican crisis in 1994-95
and Asian and Russian crisis in 1997-99), lending to emerging markets shrank
significantly and the international banks lost their confidence in the less devel-
oped countries. The Asian and Russian crises affected also emerging Asia and
Latin America. Especially Latin America was strongly hit by the contagion
effect from the Russian domestic debt default. After the beginning of the new
millennium, the emerging markets started to regain their good reputation and
cross-border lending to this region kept rising every year. First emerging Eu-
rope and Asia started to gather their breath and then Latin America caught
up in 2006. This phenomenon happened due to many different reasons, for in-
stance the global financial liberalization, new sophisticated financial products
or the eager of investors for higher yields that were not possible to gain any
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more in their home countries. Therefore more and more banks expanded their
activities to the emerging markets. The absolute peak of cross-border bank
lending was reached between mid-2007 and mid-2008.
2.3.1 Global and Local Factors
The spillover effects in cross-border lending from developed to emerging econ-
omies can be triggered by various factors. Herrmann & Mihaljek (2010) divide
these factors in two main groups which will also serve as a base for our empir-
ical research - global and local. The first are basically any factors that are not
linked to a specific country but are common to the whole world’s economy and
have as well a global impact. It might be for instance the pure contagion, i.e.
the shift in investors’ risk appetite, or the expected market volatility. By local
factors it is meant the macroeconomic fundamentals, financial indicators and
institutional characteristics of both the borrowing (host) and lending (source)
countries.
The main question to be examined is to what extent the banks from devel-
oped economies manage their lending based on the situation in their countries
and the countries to which they lend - and to what extent they let themselves
get influenced by the global situation and the attitude towards risk on the world
markets. Herrmann & Mihaljek (2010) find out in their recent empirical study
on cross-border bank flows to emerging markets that the global factors played
a major role in spreading the 2007-09 financial crisis. To be more specific, “in
the latest financial crisis, the most important channel for spillovers in cross-
border lending between advanced and emerging markets occurred were greater
expected volatility of global financial markets and reassessment of global risk”
(Herrmann & Mihaljek 2010, pg. 23). A similar finding is expected in our
analysis of a smaller sample of observed countries - the CEE region and their
lenders.
2.3.2 Push and Pull Factors
One line of the literature on interbank lending flows to emerging market coun-
tries, such as Jeanneau & Micu (2002) or Goldberg (2001), focuses on the
so-called push and pull factors (i.e. external and internal factors). In the
framework of this thesis, we might look at these factors as a further division
of the local factors, connected either to the source country (push factors) or to
the host country (pull factors). Our approach is inspired by Hernandez et al.
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(2001) who tests for the presence of pure cross-border contagion (the global
factors) after controlling for the push and pull factors (local factors). On the
contrary, Jeanneau & Micu (2002) take the risk appetite / aversion as one of
the possible push factors because it is an external factor that the host country
cannot influence.
External (push) factors include for instance structural and cyclical impulses
leading investors in the source countries to internationally diversify their port-
folios. A common explanation of these processes in the earlier literature on
this topic, e.g. Calvo et al. (1993), suggests that the impulses for cross border
investment are usually triggered by a temporary reduction in the attractive-
ness of assets in the lending countries. These may result from lower returns
on investments or lower economic growth, implying a countercyclical nature of
the most important push factors - real interest rate and real Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) in lending countries (to be further discussed). Another push
factor suggested by Jeanneau & Micu (2002) is of a regulatory character, con-
cretely the implicit or explicit guarantees by lending country governments or
international financial institutions which may cause an underpricing of the risk
of liabilities issued by borrowers in emerging market economies.
Internal (pull) factors are generally related to the borrowing countries - more
specifically to their economic policies and performance - and work through ex-
pectations of stable improvements in the risk-return trade-off of the domestic
investment projects. That means that the capital flows from developed coun-
tries are triggered either by an increase in rate of return or by reduced risk.
Some examples of such factors include significant improvements in macroe-
conomic policies (e.g. fiscal adjustment, inflation stabilization), reduction of
external debt, exchange rate stability and many others.
Jeanneau & Micu (2002) find empirical evidence that both push and pull fac-
tors of lending flows influence international bank lending. Their paper, among
others, discusses whether the factors behave procyclically or countercyclically.
According to their research, real GDP growth and real interest rate in lending
countries (the most frequent push factors) exhibit a procyclical influence on
aggregate international bank lending - the higher the variables are, the more
funds flow from international banks across borders. Their finding however con-
tradicts most of the academic literature of that time. Pull factors are by all
parties considered to behave procyclically.
In general, macroeconomic conditions of host countries (Garcia-Herrero &
Martinez-Peria 2007; Hernandez et al. 2001) and source countries (Goldberg
2. Theoretical Background 12
2001) are considered to be the major factors from the group of push and pull
factors influencing bank lending to emerging countries. After controlling for
the push and pull factors (in their case it means the macro fundamentals and
other variables which may have influenced the co-movement of capital flows
among the observed countries), Hernandez et al. (2001) arrive at the finding
that ”the availability of funds to all developing countries was an important
determinant of the flows received by each of the almost 30 recipients in the
sample” (Hernandez et al. 2001, pg. 14). This result supports the presence
of contagion in the way that capital starts flowing to the emerging economies
because it is fashionable and because the investors do not assess the riskiness of
each individual country but of the whole region. It also confirms that the push
and pull factors cannot serve as the only explanation for international capital
flows.
Hernandez et al. (2001) apply their research both on times of financial
distress and on peak times with increased investment. Their approach is rather
unique because most of the literature on contagion focuses only on the times of
crisis. It is not illogical considering that the periods of distress usually attract
much more attention and their analysis should prevent any similar events in the
future. However, it might be equally useful to examine the successful times and
realize that the same factors which trigger cross-border contagion in economic
decline periods work the opposite way in the times of recovery.
Goldberg (2001) focuses on the performance of US banks’ international lend-
ing activities and examines whether they transmit US business cycle fluctua-
tions to their foreign borrowers (i.e. capital flows influenced by home country
macroeconomic fundamentals). Similar research was made by Peek & Rosen-
green (1997) who found out that Japanese banks transmit shocks from Japan
to the US. According to Goldberg (2001), there is no general rule that could
be applied to all US banks. However, there is still some pattern which ex-
plains the behavior of US banks depending on the countries to which they lend.
For instance the US GDP growth and bank claims on industrialized countries
showed signs of negative correlation, as well as claims on emerging Asia. In
contrast to that, positive correlation appeared for US GDP growth and claims
on Latin American countries, suggesting that lending to these countries grows
along with US economy growth. Of course it must be taken into account that
this research was made about a decade ago and its findings may not be valid
any more, considering the fast changes of the world financial markets.
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2.3.3 Level of Financial Integration
Another aspect of the cross-border bank lending during crisis periods that is
often examined is the impact of financial integration between source and host
countries. Herrmann & Mihaljek (2010) find out that stronger financial inte-
gration between the emerging and advanced economies helped stabilize cross-
border lending in the times of financial crises. They call these linkages “soft
determinants” (e.g. tight relations between parent banks and their subsidiaries
in emerging Europe) and assign them more relevance than to the “hard deter-
minants”, such as interest rate differentials. In contrast to that, IMF (2009)
claims that financial interconnections within Europe increase the risk of adverse
feedback loops - a mechanism during which negative events cause a reinforcing
cycle of other negative events. Similarly, Hernandez et al. (2001) argue that the
cross-border contagion effect was stronger during the 1990s than in the earlier
crises and that it had increased partly because of tighter financial integration.
Calvo et al. (2008) analyze the empirical characteristics of systemic sud-
den stops in capital flows, and within this framework, also focus on the level
of financial integration among the examined countries. The systemic sudden
stop in this case means a large and highly unexpected capital account contrac-
tion that appears in a period of systemic turmoil. Based on their empirical
research, Calvo et al. (2008) describe a rather interesting correlation between
the probability of sudden stops and the level of financial integration.
Starting from low levels, there is a positive correlation between the two
variables but from a certain level of financial integration, the probability of a
sudden stop begins to decrease and is virtually nil at high levels of integra-
tion. The financial integration of the emerging markets unfortunately oscil-
lates around the level with the highest probability of sudden systemic stops -
in between developed and other developing countries. This fact suggests that
financial integration might be rather risky if it is not accompanied by devel-
opment of stable and trustworthy institutions that would support the use of
modern financial instruments.
2.3.4 Gravity Model
For empirical research of cross-border lending to emerging markets is often used
a so-called “gravity model”. It matches the size of bilateral linkages with host
and source country macroeconomic variables, as well as geographic, historical
and institutional factors (McGuire & Tarashev 2008). The model was first
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used by Tinbergen (1962) who linked the trade volume between two countries
to their economic size and the economic distance between them. Nowadays
it often appears in empirical works on cross-border bank lending because it
creates an ideal environment for analyzing bilateral relationships between the
examined countries. A rather sophisticated version of this model is used for
instance in Herrmann & Mihaljek (2010).
An alternative to the gravity model used in works on cross-border bank
claims might be focusing on total borrowing by emerging market countries and
explaining the mix of local and cross-border lending by foreign banks. This
approach was used for instance by Garcia-Herrero & Martinez-Peria (2007)
who analyzed the influence of local macroeconomic variables or by Goldberg
(2001) who focused on borrowings from US banks.
2.3.5 Central and Eastern Europe
The amount of literature that tackles the role of banking system and interna-
tional banks in transmitting financial crises across borders has been growing
recently and some of them, like this thesis, also focus on the CEE. From the
earlier works, it is for instance Weller & Morzuch (2000) who handle the topic
of economic transition of these countries, considering the banking sector. A
general overview of the role of foreign banks in CEE countries and its possible
implication for financial stability can be found in De Haas & Van Lelyveld
(2003), De Haas & Naaborg (2005) or in Clarke et al. (2001).
A more recent paper is by Gersˇl (2007) who analyzes the pattern of foreign
banks involvement and the risk of cross-border contagion in the CEE countries,
regarding financial stability. His work focuses on three topics: the maturity of
cross-border exposures, the concentration of foreign creditors and the existence
of common creditors (using the framework of Van Rijckeghem & Weder (1999)).
It examines the “fundamental-based” contagion (in this case through the cross-
border claims channel) and does not focus on the pure contagion. The work
concludes that any contagion through the foreign bank lending would have
to be generated by a large shock in the source country with a major impact
on creditor countries to CEE. In 2007, Gersˇl concluded that the risk of cross-
border contagion was relatively low, also considering the stability of the creditor
countries in that time. It will be up to our work to find out whether the 2007-
09 financial crisis was a sufficiently “large shock” to trigger the cross-border
contagion through cross-border claims in the CEE region.
2. Theoretical Background 15
2.4 Multinational Banks and Their Subsidiaries
Most of the literature on cross-border contagion examines the international
funds flows from an aggregate point of view, i.e. from country to country by
using the BIS data. However, there are some works that focus on the rela-
tionship and transmission mechanisms between multinational banks and their
subsidiaries through the so-called internal capital market. This market serves
as a mean to re-allocate resources between the banks and their subsidiaries in
order to keep balance among the whole international banking group. Hous-
ton et al. (1997) examine this phenomenon across the United States whereas
De Haas & Van Lelyveld (2009) look at it from the European perspective.
De Haas & Van Lelyveld (2009) divide the potential shocks that influ-
ence the internal capital market into two categories: financial shocks and real-
economy shocks. Both of these shocks might of course happen in the source
country (parent bank’s country), as well as in the host country (subsidiary’s
country). A financial shock originates in a bank itself and causes a substantial
decrease in its capital (for instance a fraud). In case of a host country financial
shock, the parent bank helps its subsidiary by allocating additional capital and
in case of a source country shock, the parent bank draws off the funds from
its subsidiaries in order to restore its financial health. A real-economy shock,
on the other hand, originates outside the banking system and causes overall
changes in the investment opportunities in the affected country. This shock
has a more adverse effect on the cross-border capital flows than the financial
one.
De Haas & Van Lelyveld (2009) call the effect of a real-economy shock
substitution effect and their findings about it are also important for our re-
search. They have empirically proven that multinational banks can sharpen
the business cycle in a host country through always shifting the funds to the
most profitable countries - which means accelerating the growth if the country
is growing but also deepening the recession if the country is affected by one.
In the framework of this thesis and the 2007-09 crisis, the substitution effect
might be considered as the influence of local factors on multinational banks.
Hence there still remains the question whether this effect outweighs the pure
contagion, i.e. the influence of global factors such as world markets’ volatility.
The answer to this question should be the same in case of an aggregate dataset
(e.g. BIS data) as in the case of individual banks’ data.
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Hoggarth et al. (2010) examine the difference between intergroup and intra-
group bank lending during the recent financial crisis on the BIS financial data.
Through a simple regression they come to the conclusion that international
banks have tended to reduce lending by more if it has been made to banks
outside of their banking group, i.e. not to their subsidiaries. They suggest that
the cut in international lending has not been so severe in a number of CEE
countries where foreign banks have a large local presence.
2.5 Former World Financial Crises
At the end of the literature review, it might be useful to get some deeper
understanding of the most important former financial crises (both primarily
currency-driven) that are often subject to the empirical studies - Mexican
“Tequilla crisis” in 1994-95 and the Asian crisis of 1997-98.
The Mexican financial crisis arose from a sudden devaluation of the Mexican
peso in December 1994 and afterwards spread to Brazil and the Southern coun-
tries of South America. The economic situation in Mexico had been alarming
long before the outburst of the crisis - the country went through a period of
hyperinflation, low oil prices, low interest rates and political instability. The
fixed exchange rate to USD was no longer maintainable and despite previous
promises to the investors, the government had suddenly decided to devaluate
their currency. This step only scared more investors away and further increased
Mexico’s risk profile which originated the financial crisis (Frankel & Schmukler
1996).
The Asian financial crisis originated in Thailand in July 1997 when the
Thai baht collapsed after the Thai government had decided to cut its peg to
the USD. The currency collapse was only the last drop leading to Thailand’s
bankruptcy, preceded by a severe financial distress period (partly real estate
driven) and acquiring a burden of foreign debt. The crisis then spread rather
fast to the surrounding countries through devaluating currencies, stock markets
and other asset prices. The financial crisis caused after Thailand the most harm
in Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, Hong Kong, Laos and the Philippines
(Kaufman et al. 1999).
Even if the scenarios of these two crises might seem quite similar, Herrmann
& Mihaljek (2010) find out that from the cross-border contagion and withdrawal
of funds point of view, they differ rather substantially. According to them,
during the Asian crisis global risk factors made the largest contribution to the
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reduction in cross-border bank flows. The other two important factors that
contributed to the reduction were the reduction of emerging markets growth
rates and the deterioration of financial indicators in borrower countries (i.e.
higher public deficits or worsening health of the banking sector).
On the contrary, the deteriorating global financial conditions did not play a
major role during the Mexican crisis. The main reason for that is the origina-
tion of the crisis from financial distress in only one emerging market economy.
Therefore the withdrawal of cross-border capital flows was mainly caused by the
borrower-specific risk factors. The good financial health of the lending coun-
tries and rather tight monetary linkages between the source and host countries
enabled a relatively fast stabilization of the whole situation, in contrast to the
latest world financial crisis.
Chapter 3
2007-09 Financial Crisis
3.1 How It All Began
In order to examine properly the behavior of international banks during the
2007-09 financial crisis, it is necessary to have a deeper understanding of the
whole crisis and its origins. Therefore this chapter will describe the whole
story since the housing prices bubble and US subprime mortgage crisis until the
transmission to European and basically all world economies. It will mention
all important milestones and try to reveal the reasons behind the unexpectedly
fast and extensive spreading of the crisis.
It might seem that the 2007-09 crisis started by the subprime mortgage
crisis in 2007 but in fact its roots reach further back to the past. One of the
indisputable causes, described for instance by Ivashina & Scharfstein (2010)
or Lin (2008), is the expansionary US monetary policy after the bursting of
tech-stock bubble in 2000-01. This recession was eased by Federal Reserve
System (FED) lowering the interest rate which fell from 6.5% in January 2001
to 1% in June 2003. The low costs of funds stimulated a boom on the housing
market and the higher housing prices led to a consumption boom that together
with FED’s continued expansionary monetary policy kept the US economy in
excess liquidity. It was possible to keep such a low US and also global real
interest rate because of the developing countries accumulating large volumes
of US assets and keeping the huge US current account deficit by their current
account surpluses, without any significant changes in real interest or exchange
rates.
As a result of the continuously low interest rates, the banks and other fi-
nancial institutions had to search for higher yields by more sophisticated (and
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therefore also risky) financial instruments. This is where most of the finan-
cial innovation came from and unfortunately most of the new instruments were
carried out by unregulated financial institutions or were too complex to be effec-
tively regulated. The whole financial system could be described by the phrase
“originate and distribute”. Most of the loans or mortgages did not stay in
the original institution until their maturity but were put in different tranches
of some “structured” investment products often referred to as Collateralized
Debt Obligation (CDO) and sold to other financial institutions - often even
more than just once. So in the end, no one really knew what collateral the
particular security was backed by, and all the instruments seemed almost risk-
free as they claimed to be based on a risk-diversified portfolio. A significant
role in this whole process of inflating the housing bubble was played by the two
quasi-federal agencies Fannie Mae (FNMA) and Federal Home Loan Mortgage
Corporation (FHLMC) that were for a long time encouraged to buy subprime
mortgages but their risk rating was highly underestimated by most of the ana-
lysts. And then in mid 2007, the housing bubble suddenly burst and the wave
of contagion started to spread through the global financial system to the real
economy.
What followed after the housing market collapse can be described as a
typical liquidity spiral that started with steep falls of the prices of assets on the
financial institutions’ balance sheets as everyone had realized their true value.
It was not only the prices of real estate falling down but the value decrease
struck basically all assets - the US stock market alone lost USD 8 trillion of its
wealth between October 2007 when it reached an all-time peak and October
2008 (Brunnermeier 2009). The propagation mechanism of falling prices was
amplified through the off-balance-sheet investment vehicles that were created
by most commercial banks to finance their mortgages and other long-term
assets. Such an off-balance-sheet investment vehicle is often called a Structured
Investment Vehicle (SIV). These SIVs were dangerous for two reasons - first,
they were not subject to such a strong regulation and capital requirements as
their parent banks and second, there was a maturity mismatch between their
assets and liabilities.
While mortgages which were on the asset side usually had maturities mea-
sured in years or even decades, the asset-backed securities used by the SIVs for
raising funds had much shorter maturities - in average 90 days for short-term in-
struments and just over one year for medium-term notes (Brunnermeier 2009).
The reason behind is that most investors prefer assets with short maturities so
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that they can withdraw them more flexibly to fulfill their own funding needs.
After the housing market bubble had burst and investors had realized the true
value of the CDOs’ collateral, they suddenly stopped buying them and the SIVs
were exposed to a dry up in funding liquidity because they could not roll over
their short-term debt. The sponsoring banks were affected by the dry-up al-
most instantly through a so-called liquidity backstop which was a credit line
granted to the SIV to ensure its funding liquidity. Therefore the liquidity risk
arising from the maturity mismatch transferred from the “shadow” banking
system to the real one.
The meltdown of subprime mortgages and all types of securitized products
questioned the solvency and liquidity of all financial institutions. After the
fall of Lehman Brothers and Washington Mutual in September 2008 and sub-
sequent government takeovers of FNMA, FHLMC and American International
Group (AIG), it developed into such a banking panic that the world had proba-
bly never seen before. Banks almost suddenly reacted by cutting their lending
which substantially increased the costs of funds, prices of all assets and com-
modities fell dramatically and the omnipresent insecurity about future devel-
opments increased market volatility to critical levels. Notwithstanding the fact
that the governments reacted almost instantly by cutting the central banks’
interest rates, the banks were just too cautious and created large cushions of
excess reserves against unexpected future losses. This so-called “credit crunch”
despite the anti-crisis monetary policies proves the procyclical behavior of large
international banks and helps to spread the recession into real economy through
lack of sources of funding.
3.2 Transmission to Developing Countries
The propagation mechanism of the 2007-09 crisis from the US to the rest of
the world is a rather complex topic which can be viewed and examined from
various angles. Our work handles the crisis transmission to CEE countries and
as these are considered to be part of the developing world, it might be useful to
examine how the crisis had spread to the developing economies and whether it
was any different from the rest of the world. This topic is handled for instance
by Lin (2008) or Herrmann & Mihaljek (2010).
It has already been mentioned that the US entered into a phase of fast eco-
nomic growth at the beginning of the third millennium and this has been a
positive turn for the developing world too. There is evidence that these coun-
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tries had begun the period in much better shape than before, considering the
macroeconomic fundamentals, as well as the political and institutional situa-
tion. Most of the countries managed to reach lower inflation, more sustainable
fiscal situation and regarding the CEE countries, they had just concluded the
first decade of democracy after the communist regime which helped to settle
the most turbulent transitional issues. Altogether it was a good basis for a
period of fast economic growth.
The favorable conditions in the developing countries would probably be
enough for a moderate growth but this has been further accelerated by the
economic boom of the developed countries, especially the US. The most im-
portant factors that helped to transmit the growth were, according to Lin
(2008) the increased export, higher commodity prices, bigger Foreign Direct
Investment (FDI) and increased remittances from abroad. Put into numbers,
the developing countries increased their exports by an average of 10.3% per
year during the first 8 years of this decade while keeping their imports on just
4.4% per year. Taken as a share of GDP, their exports increased from 29%
in 2000 to 39% in 2007. Another important factor, the commodity prices, in-
creased sharply during the respective years which can be seen in Figure 3.1.
Net private capital flows to developing countries increased only in 2007 by USD
269 billion to unprecedented USD 1 trillion. Bond flows and net bank lending
increased from virtually nil in 2002 to 3% of developed countries’ GDP in 2007
and in the same year another important source of capital, the remittances from
workers in foreign countries, also increased sharply to approx. USD 240 billion
(Lin 2008).
All the above mentioned sources of financing led to an investment boom
in many developing countries (India, China, Russia etc.) which further stimu-
lated economic growth in the developed world through demand for their capital
goods. This growth caused additional capital inflow to the developing econ-
omies and resulted in a self-reinforcing cycle that brought the highest GDP
growth rates in the developing world’s history - in average 5% per year be-
tween 2003 and 2007.
Another important factor for the successful cooperation of the developed
and developing economies were the low costs of production in the latter ones
which offset the rising commodity prices and overall inflation pressure. How-
ever, in 2007 many developing countries started to hit their capacity constraints
and signaled that the euphoric period of overall world growth was soon to come
to an end. The cost of resources increased sharply and the US twin deficits -
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Figure 3.1: Commodity Price Indices (2000-10), 2000=100
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fiscal and current-account - caused the dollar to depreciate and led to greater
volatility in commodity prices (a sharp decrease between 2008 and 2009 can
be seen in Figure 3.1). If we had depicted the developing countries’ conditions
at the beginning of this decade as an indicator of economic growth, then the
conditions at the end of this decade should be seen as an indicator of economic
downturn.
The two possible propagation mechanisms of a crisis - finance and trade
- have already been discussed in Chapter 2 and it is believed that the 2007-
09 crisis has mostly been spread through the financial contagion (Lin 2008;
Griffith-Jones & Ocampo 2009). Or at least the financial contagion in most
countries came before the real economy effects, including the developing coun-
tries. The interest rate spreads soared, many currencies depreciated because
the traders shifted their positions towards the “more stable ones” and the
stock markets collapsed due to slumping commodity prices. In general, the key
channel for transmission of the crisis from developed to developing countries
happened via private capital flows - both through volumes and costs of such
flows. That goes hand in hand with the credit crunch and cut of foreign bank
lending that is the main topic of this work. The increased foreign ownership of
developing countries’ banks which is quite common for the CEE region turned
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out to be more a source of vulnerability than stability. Many of these banks cut
lending to their subsidiaries in developing countries in order to strengthen their
weak home positions. Other factors which influenced the flow of cross-border
bank loans are examined in detail in Chapter 4.
In general, countries with large balance-of-payments and fiscal deficits were
much more vulnerable to the crisis propagation mechanisms. When the capital
inflow dried up and current account shifted from deficit to balance, it was much
more problematic for them to find additional sources of financing due to the
already large fiscal deficit. According to Griffith-Jones & Ocampo (2009), the
hardest hit by the crisis were the CEE transition economies because of their
current account deficits and high vulnerability of the domestic financial system
which led to rapid withdrawals of private capital flows.
3.3 The 2007-09 Crisis in CEE
3.3.1 European Context
To understand fully the situation of CEE countries during the 2007-09 crisis,
it is necessary to examine them not only in the developing world context but
also in the European context. One of the most significant differences between
the European and US crises were the pre-crisis conditions. In general, Europe
did not suffer from the macroeconomic imbalances that had caused the over-
seas crisis and most European banks did not hold any subprime mortgages or
US mortgage backed securities. However, they relied on the same short-term
wholesale financing from the same liquidity pool as the SIVs. For instance,
this happened to be fatal for British Northern Rock which after facing a run
on bank had to be taken into public ownership in 2008. Basically all Euro-
pean banks had to face substantial liquidity shortages and write off significant
amounts of assets because of the global credit crunch. As a consequence, most
of the European governments had to intervene and bail them out, following the
US example.
This thesis is built on an assumption that the 2007-09 crisis in Europe
was imported through the financial system and afterwards transmitted to the
real economy through a substantial cut in loans to non-financial corporations
and households. It has been empirically proven by several economists, such as
Nikolov (2010), who also claims the financial sector to have procyclical effects
on the economy, boosting the yields during good times and deepening the losses
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during bad times. Further on in his research, he finds evidence for positive cor-
relation between capital in the banking system and economic growth. Countries
with better capitalized banks experience smaller declines during times of crisis
because they have a bigger reserve cushion which can absorb shocks to the
system and limit deleveraging - the 2007-09 crisis being no exception.
3.3.2 Crisis Impact on CEE
It is important to note right at the beginning that the 2007-09 crisis has not
hit the CEE countries (or the whole Europe) evenly and that its consequences
were different throughout the region. The extent of the crisis varied across the
countries, depending on such factors as the capitalization of the banking sector,
the size of government deficit, the dependence on exports, the amount of loans
in foreign currency, or the exchange rate regime. The beginning of the crisis
also varied across the region, depending on the type of “wake-up call” in each
country and the local conditions.
Out of all the CEE countries and the source countries examined in this
thesis, Poland was the only one that managed to keep its GDP growth from
2008 to 2009 above zero. The values for all the countries are presented in
Figure 3.2. The European Union (EU) average is -4.2% and it can be seen
quite clearly that most CEE countries besides the Czech Republic are below
this level. When comparing the source and host countries, the first group is
deffinitely better off - with France, Belgium and Austria above the EU average
and Germany and Italy slightly below it. Slovenia experienced the sharpest
GDP drop out of all examined countries and also out of the whole Eurozone
(-7.8%), led by a 21.6% y-o-y drop in gross fixed capital expenditure. Also
Slovenia’s inflation was the highest out of the Eurozone in 2009 (6.6%).
In general, the Viszegrad countries (Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland and
Hungary) overcame the crisis easier than the Balkan countries (Croatia, Slove-
nia, Bulgaria, Romania), with the exception of Hungary. Hungary was one
of the countries to be hardest hit initially by the crisis, mainly due to a high
share of loans in foreign currency (euros and Swiss francs). Figure 3.5 shows
that Hungary had the highest share of FX loans from all the CEE countries
- almost 60% of total loans to both corporates and households. The loans’
conditions were more favourable compared to the ones in Hungarian forints,
however when the financial crisis started, they became poison pills to the Hun-
garian economy. Forint depreciation which would otherwise bring the economy
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Figure 3.2: Real GDP Growth by Country (2008-09)
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competitive advantage in exports, caused it much more trouble by increasing
the value of loans that households, corporations and the government had to roll
over. Many debtors thus started to default on their liabilities, the conditions
in the country worsened, and the subsequent depreciation closed an imaginary
viscious circle. This viscious circle has only been broken by substantial balance
of payments support from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the EU.
The newest EU member states, Bulgaria and Romania, have had the lowest
living standards from the whole Union even before the 2007-09 crisis. Unfor-
tunately, the crisis did not spare them and because of belonging to the hardest
hit countries, their situation got even worse. The unemployment rate over 8%
(Figure 3.3) and an extensive government deficit (Figure 3.4) are only further
indicators of the deteriorated economic conditions. The damages might have
been less severe if the countries had been included in the EU’s 2007-13 budget
which would have given them access to the large EU funds (e.g. the European
Structural Funds).
Out of Bulgaria and Romania, the latter one was affected harder by the
recession. Its GDP drop was the second biggest out of all examined source
and host countries and its public debt was the biggest one in both 2008 and
2009 (5.4% and 8.3% of GDP respectively). A high government deficit is on
one hand a consequence of a crisis but on the other hand it also allows for a
more severe impact of the crisis. As already explained in Section 3.2, large
fiscal deficits make countries more vulnerable to crisis propagation mechanisms
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because they have difficulties finding additional sources of financing. However,
we should keep in mind that it is only one of many possible factors influencing
the crisis expansion. It is more relevant for developing countries than for the
developed ones (such as our source countries) which have more stable financial
systems and better financing options.
Figure 3.3: Unemployment Rate (2009) Figure 3.4: Public Debt (% GDP)
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Figure 3.5: FX Loans (2008) Figure 3.6: Goods Exports (2008; % GDP)
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Source: Czech National Bank. Croatian National Bank. Eurostat.
Note Figure 3.5: Loans in foreign currency are calculated as percentage of total loans.
HR - data for households and corporations together.
Another disadvantage of Romania during the crisis was its high share of
loans in foreign currency - the second highest from the CEE in 2008 concerning
both households and corporates (Figure 3.5). Hungary and Romania are rather
outstanding examples in terms of loans in foreign currency and all the other
countries except Bulgaria in corporate loans reach no more than a half of their
values. The least dependent country on loans in foreign currency is the Czech
Republic whose households basically do not borrow in any other currency than
the Czech crown and corporations borrow less than 20% of their total loans.
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These characteristics of the Czech Republic definitely had a positive influence
on its ability to cope with the crisis. As a small open economy dependent on
exports (see Figure 3.6), it could depreciate its currency to gain more competi-
tiveness without any negative effects through the foreign loans mechanism seen
e.g. in Hungary. Of course it was not spared from the adverse affects caused
by the demand slump on its core exporting markets (Germany, Poland, France,
UK etc.). However, it still belongs together with Poland to the CEE countries
which were least affected by the 2007-09 crisis. Poland is a rather specific case
in the region because of its lower dependency on exports and foreign trade in
general. But when looking at its unemployment rate of 11% (the third highest
from the examined countries) and fiscal deficit of 7% (also the third highest),
we might see some other problems arising in the future.
Slovakia and Slovenia also have very low amount of loans in foreign currency
but the interpretation differs for them as they are members of the Eurozone.
Taken into account that most foreign currency loans in Europe are contracted in
euros, it is not so surprising that Slovenia only had very little of them. Slovakia
did not join the Eurozone until 1 January 2009 so its foreign currency loans
in 2008 included the ones in euros, however their low amount did not bring
much advantage to Slovakian economy. Neither Slovakia, nor Slovenia could
deflate their currency in 2008 - in case of Slovakia because of the Maastricht
convergence criteria - and thus they could not gain competitive advantage on
their export markets. As they are both strongly dependent on exports (see
Figure 3.6) this monetary policy limitation has caused some serious damage to
their economies.
3.3.3 Cross-Border Lending to CEE
Section 3.3.2 describes the situation of the CEE region during the 2007-09 crisis
and which factors had positive or negative impact on the way each country has
coped with it. One of these factors which also belongs to the major topics of this
thesis are the cross-border bank loans. According to the Bank for International
Settlements (BIS) statistics, international banks started to withdraw funding
from some emerging markets in the third quarter of 2008 (08Q3) and CEE has
been no exception in this regard. Figure 3.7 shows exchange rate adjusted
changes of external liabilities of all BIS reporting banks1 towards all sectors
1Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Belgium, Bermuda, Brazil, Canada, Cayman
Islands, Chile, Chinese Taipei, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Guernsey, Hong Kong SAR, India, Ireland, Isle of Man, Italy, Japan, Jersey, Korea, Luxem-
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in CEE from 08Q1 until the end of 2009. The funding drop in 08Q3 was
rather sharp as the cross-border liabilities increased only by about USD 5 bn,
compared to almost USD 40 bn during the previous two quarters. 08Q4 was
the first quarter when the total amount of liabilities decreased and with a slight
exception of 09Q2, it kept decreasing throughout the whole year 2009.
Figure 3.7: Cross-border Liabilities towards CEE (2008-09; USD bn)
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Source: BIS locational statistics.
Note: Exchange rate adjusted changes in external liabilities of BIS reporting banks towards
all sectors in CEE.
According to BIS (2009), countries with sound and relatively liquid banking
systems were affected first from all emerging markets. It is believed that it was
caused by some international banks who wanted to reduce liquidity shortages
in their home markets. The reasons behind cross-border loans cuts in CEE
will be examined in the empirical Chapter 4 - whether it was the distress of
banks in source countries, worsening conditions of host countries, pure financial
contagion in the form of increased investors’ riks aversion or any other local
or global factor. However, we should now have a look at the intensity of cuts
in each host country and some economic and banking sector characteristics
that might have influenced the funding drop consequences. Figure 3.8 presents
exchange rate adjusted changes of external liabilities of BIS reporting banks
towards all sectors in each CEE country.
We can see that the Czech Republic and Poland which probably have the
soundest banking systems were the first ones to get into negative changes which
bourg, Macao SAR, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, Netherlands Antilles, Norway, Panama,
Portugal, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom,
United States
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supports the BIS (2009) hypothesis. The largest drop of USD 11 bn happened
in Slovakia in 09Q1. This could partly be caused by the country’s conversion
to euro and investors’ skepticism towards such step in the middle of a financial
crisis. Another Viszegrad country, Hungary, was also affected by a rather steep
fall of cross-border loans but in this case a more severe drop was probably
prevented by the IMF and EU financial support. The Balkan countries have not
been subject to such big changes as the Viszegrad countries in total amounts,
however relative to the size of their GDP, the effects are quite comparable. The
biggest drop among them happened in Romania in 09Q1 and it amounted to
USD 2 bn.
Figure 3.8: Cross-border Loans by Country (08Q2-09Q1; USD bn)
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Note: Exchange rate adjusted changes in external liabilities of BIS reporting banks towards
all sectors in each CEE country.
The size of cross-border loans cuts is for sure a relevant piece of information,
however it needs to be accompanied by some characteristics of the borrowing
countries and their banking sectors. One factor that plays a major role in the
dependence of a certain country on external financing are its net external assets
(foreign financial assets - foreign financial liabilities) presented in Figure 3.9 as
percentage of GDP. According to this figure, the Czech Republic and Slovenia
are the only two countries out of the whole CEE region which are net lenders
3. 2007-09 Financial Crisis 30
and not net borrowers to the world banking system. Therefore the cut of
external financing of their credit expansion might not have had such a crucial
impact on the spreading of the 2007-09 to their economies. The three most
dependent countries on external financing are Romania, Hungary and Bulgaria
- with their net external assets ranging between -15% and -20% of GDP. All
these countries have been hit by the crisis rather severely.
Figure 3.9: Net External Assets (2008) Figure 3.10: Deposit-Loan Ratio (2008)
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Source: Czech National Bank. Croatian National Bank.
Note Figure 3.9: Net external assets are calculated as percentage of GDP.
Another important factor that captures the dependence on external financ-
ing is banks’ deposit-to-loan ratio. This ratio is computed by dividing the
amount of bank’s deposits by its loans and it tells us how much the bank is
relying on borrowed funds. If the ratio is high, the bank finances most of its
loans from deposits, and if it is low, the bank needs to seek for other sources
of financing, such as external loans. The values for the CEE countries are pre-
sented in Figure 3.10. The EU average is 86% and three CEE countries range
above this level - the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland. The first two are
even more special because their ratio is higher than 100% which means that
their banks receive more deposits than give loans - quite a rare example to be
found in Europe. These countries should, ceteris paribus, be less sensitive to
changes in cross-border bank flows. The opposite side of the scale is occupied
by Slovenia and Hungary, from which the latter one has been for sure more
affected by the low deposit-to-loan ratio because of its combination with low
net external assets ratio.
One of the last issues to be mentioned regarding the cross-border bank
flows to CEE is the difference between “foreign” and “international” claims in
the BIS terminology. Mosts analysts were using the BIS data for an assessment
of the roll-over risk of the CEE countries during the 2007-09 crisis. Out of
these data they usually picked the “foreign” claims statistics which does not
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only cover direct cross-border exposure of BIS reporting banks towards the
CEE countries (“international” claims) but also local claims of reporting banks’
affiliates in CEE in local currency. Considering the fact that many local affiliates
are predominantly financed by local deposits (such as in the Czech Republic or
Slovakia) or may have other sources of financing than loans from their foreign
mother banks, the “foreign” claims create a false picture of the CEE dependency
on external financing. Figure 3.11 shows the difference between “foreign” and
“international” claims for each country as percentage of GDP. The biggest share
of local claims of foreign affiliates on total “foreign” claims is characteristic for
the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland who were thus most affected by the
analysts’ data misinterpretation.
Figure 3.11: Foreign Claims (2008; % GDP)
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Note Figure 3.11: HR - data for 2010.
Chapter 4
Empirical Testing
4.1 Choosing the Right Model
The purpose of our empirical research is to discover what global and local
factors influenced the cuts in cross-border bank loans in the CEE countries,
i.e. helped to spread the 2007-09 financial crisis. The methodology builds on
the existing empirical literature, especially on Herrmann & Mihaljek (2010)
who examine the cross-border bank flows to world emerging markets, McGuire
& Tarashev (2008) who look at banks’ health and its influence on lending to
emerging markets, Jeanneau & Micu (2002) who focus on push and pull factors
and bank lending, and De Haas & Van Lelyveld (2009) who examine linkages
between parent banks and their foreign subsidiaries.
Our data sample covers 8 CEE countries, namely the Czech Republic, Slo-
vakia, Poland, Hungary, Slovenia, Croatia, Bulgaria and Romania, which are
examined as the borrowing “host” countries. Some literature on the CEE re-
gion, such as Gersˇl (2007), focuses also on the Baltic states - Latvia, Lithuania
and Estonia. However, these countries are known for a high share of banking
sector owned by the Scandinavian countries and thus do not fit to our group
of 5 “source” (lending) countries which is Austria, Germany, France, Italy and
Belgium. These countries were chosen mainly for the presence of big bank-
ing groups across the CEE region, such as Austrian Erste Bank and Raiffeisen,
French Societe Generale, Belgian KBC, Italian UniCredit or German Deutsche
Bank or Commerzbank.
The examied time period stretches from 2001 to 2009 using quarterly val-
ues, as the dependent variable (the cross-border loans) is recorded quarterly.
The beginning of the observation has been set for 2001 mainly due to data
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availability reasons. The calcualtion of the risk appetite index is based on the
exchange rates of several world currencies towards euro and uses also forward
rates going more than one year backwards, so 2001 was the first year for which
the index could be calculated properly. Another reason behind the time period
choice is that the 1990s were a transformation period for the CEE region which
is often characterized by very chaotic and unreasonable data samples - if they
are available at all. Compared to that, the observations after 2001 should be
more stable and show better relations amongst the examined variables.
All variables in our model have been either taken as a logarithm or, where
it was a percentage, smoothed by the moving average method. In that case,
the value at time t is calculated as the average over the period 〈t − 2, t + 2〉.
When using the logarithm of a certain variable, we had to deal with negative
values - for instance by the dependent variable. For that purpose we use the
same method as Herrmann & Mihaljek (2010): for negative value we take the
logarithm of the absolute value and assign it a negative sign.
The data are analyzed as panel data that pool together time series of cross-
sections. Each section represents one pair of host and source countries which
makes 40 sections in total, observed over time t (t = 1, . . . , 36). The poolability
of the data, i.e. the stability of coefficients across sections, has been tested
using the Chow test and the results supported the panel data approach. More
detailed description of the test outcomes will be presented in Section 4.4.
In order to capture all different kinds of effects that might have influenced
the cross-border bank flows in CEE during the 2007-09 crisis, we have created
a basic model and three other extension models. Each of them is trying to
explain different aspects of cross-border bank lending, looking at it from a
different point of view. Our Basic model comprises the following variables:
l LOANSijt = β0 + β1GROWTHijt + β2MM INTijt + εijt (4.1)
where
• l LOANSijt is the logarithm of an exchange rate adjusted change in the
claims of BIS reporting banks in source country i (i = 1, . . . , 5) vis-a`-vis
all sectors in CEE host country j (j = 1, . . . , 8) at time t (t = 1, . . . , 36)
(source: BIS),
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• GROWTHijt is the GDP growth of host country j minus GDP growth of
source country i in percentages at time t (source: Eurostat),
• MM INTijt is the money market interest rate (rate on short-term lend-
ing between financial institutions) of host country j minus money market
interest rate of source country i in percentages at time t (source: IMF,
European Central Bank (ECB))
• and εijt are the error terms.
The Basic model specifications are the following:
1. Global Model
l LOANSijt = β0 + β1GROWTHijt + β2MM INTijt +
+ β3KP INDEXt + β4 l V OLATILITYt + εijt
(4.2)
where
• KP INDEXt is the investors’ risk appetite index at time t, calcu-
lated according to Kumar & Persaud (2002) (the calculation details
will be described in Section 4.3.3),
• and l V OLATILITYt is the logarithm of The Chicago Board Op-
tions Exchange S&P 100 Volatility Index at time t (source: Bloomberg).
The Global model corresponds to the idea that cross-border bank loans
are mostly influenced by variables determined on a global basis, with sup-
posedly global effects (the “global factors”). Therefore the Basic model
is extended by two more variables - the risk aversion index and volatility.
The former is used as an overall indicator of the willingness of market
participants to take on risk and the latter as an indicator of the expected
short-term volatility of the global financial market (i.e. the level of risk),
based on the weighted average of implied volatilities for a wide range of
strikes.
2. Lender Model
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l LOANSijt = β0 + β1GROWTHijt + β2MM INTijt + β3 LLP Sit +
+ β4NIM Sit + εijt (4.3)
where
• LLP Sit is the average ratio of loan loss provisions to net interest
revenue in banks in source country i at time t in percentages (source:
Bankscope database),
• and NIM Sit is the average net interest margin in banks in source
country i at time t in percentages (source: Bankscope database).
The Lender model corresponds to the idea that “local factors” in source
countries have major influence on the loans coming from these countries
to the CEE region. The loan loss provsions ratio is a proxy for the general
financial condition of a bank and therefore its country average might be
a proxy for the soundness of the local banking sector (“bank health”). It
is the relationship between provisions in the profit and loss account and
the interest income over the same period. In a well run bank, these ratios
should be as low as possible and if the lending book is higher risk, it should
be compensated by higher interest margins. If the ratio deteriorates, it
means that risk is not being properly remunerated by margins. The net
interest margin is a bank performance indicator, calculated as a ratio of
net interest income to earning assets. Higher margins and profitability
are desirable as long as the asset quality is being maintained.
3. Borrower Model
l LOANSijt = β0 + β1GROWTHijt + β2MM INTijt + β3 LLP Hjt +
+ β4GBAL Hjt + β5 FDI Hjt + εijt (4.4)
where
• LLP Hjt is the average ratio of loan loss provisions to net interest
revenue in banks in host country j at time t in percentages (source:
Bankscope database),
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• GBAL Hjt is the government balance as a percentage of GDP in host
country j at time t (source: Eurostat, Croatian Bureau of Statistics),
• and FDI Hjt is the foreign investment to the host country j as a
percentage of GDP at time t (source: IMF).
The Borrower model corresponds to the idea that factors which make
a host country most vulnerable to cuts in foreign lending are its own
characteristics, especially the ones indicating its potentional riskiness.
These are represented by the loan loss provisions ratio (i.e. the soundness
of the bankig sector used also in the Lender model) and the government
balance which is the net lending (+) or net borrowing (-) by the country’s
government. Higher fiscal deficit is believed to indicate higher probability
of future default on government debt and thus a higher risk profile of the
host country. The foreign direct investment is taken as a proxy for the
openness of the host country’s economy which besides bank investment
covers also other sources of capital inflow.
A big part of the literature that was described in Chapter 2 analyzes the
financial contagion through a “common lender effect”, assuming the existence
of a “ground zero” country where the crisis has originated. The models are
based on the exposure (e.g. foreign loans) of the examined region towards the
ground zero country. This framework however cannot be used for our analysis
because there is basically no direct exposure of the CEE countries towards the
US. We could use the exposure of the source countries but there are no data
on international loans between our source countries and the US. Therefore we
restrict our analysis to the global factors, such as investors’ attitude toward
risk, which were certainly influenced by the situation in the US.
Another model that we have considered was a gravity model, used e.g.
by Herrmann & Mihaljek (2010). The model builds on an assumption that
the geographical proximity of the source and host countries has a significant
influence on the flows of funds between them. A distance between the countries’
capitals is therefore taken as one of the explanatory variables. This approach
usually works for large data samples covering the whole world and with large
variety of distances. However, it did not work for our data sample with all the
examined countries concentrated on a very small area. As the distance between
capitals is a time-independent variable, it requires the use of a random effects
estimator because the fixed one would wipe out all the variable’s effects due
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to a near-singular matrix. However, the intercepts differ significantly across
the examined sections (for details see Section 4.4) so the random effects model
would have to be extended by dummies for the different sections that would
cover the fixed effects. When testing this model, the distance variable did not
show any signs of signifiance so we have decided to abandon the gravity model.
4.2 Hypotheses and Assumptions
Our main hypothesis is that both local and global factors have a significant in-
fluence on the cross-border loans from BIS reporting banks in our chosen source
countries to the banking and non-banking sectors in our chosen CEE host coun-
tries. The model specification goes even further by dividing the local factors
to the ones related to a source country (Lender model) and the ones related to
a host country (Borrower model). We presume that all the variables included
in our model in Section 4.1 will be significant and our expected signs of their
coefficients are stated in Table 4.1. It has to be noted, though, that our hy-
pothesis is already based on some previous testing of a larger data sample. The
variables that had throughout our preparatory phase appeared non-significant
or highly correlated with some others have been excluded from the model and
are stated in Section 4.3, Table 4.2.
One of our hypotheses is that pure contagion, i.e. the change in investors’
risk appetite/aversion has helped to spread the 2007-09 financial crisis to the
CEE countries through a significant influence on the cut of cross-border bank
loans. However, we have to keep in mind that our risk appetite index is a
global index of pure contagion and as such does not tell us about the risk
appetite/aversion only towards the CEE region. The general idea behind this
index is that if investors’ risk aversion rises, they tend to reduce their exposure
to risky assets and shift their portfolios towards seemingly safer ones. Another
part of our hypothesis therefore needs to state that the CEE countries are con-
sidered relatively risky compared to the rest of the source countries’ portfolios.
An increase in investors’s risk aversion thus reduces the amount of loans to the
host countries which induces a positive sign of the KP INDEX coefficient. A
negative sign of the KP INDEX coefficient would, on the other hand, contra-
dict our hypothesis and induce that the CEE countries are no longer considered
a risky region.
There are several hypotheses to be tested in this thesis and they will either
be confirmed or rejected, according to the results of our empirical research.
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Table 4.1: Expected Signs of Coefficients
Variable Sign Description
Basic model
GROWTH ⊕ A higher GDP growth of host country j rela-
tive to source country i should, ceteris paribus,
increase the amount of cross-border loans from
banks in country i to all sectors in country j.
MM INT ⊕ A higher interest rate in country j relative to
country i should, ceteris paribus, motivate the
banks in country i by higher yields to increase
the cross-border loans to country j.
Global model
KP INDEX ⊕ A higher investors’ risk appetite should, ce-
teris paribus, increase loans to “risky” countries
which, we believe, is still the perception of the
CEE region.
l V OLATILITY 	 A higher volatility of the global financial
markets should, ceteris paribus, decrease the
amount of investments in general and therefore
also loans from country i to country j.
Lender model
LLP S 	 The amount of loan loss provisions as an indi-
cator of health of the banking sector in country
i should, ceteris paribus, have a negative effect
on the amount of loans flowing from country i
to country j or anywhere else.
NIM S ⊕ The net interest margin as an indicator of per-
formance and profitability of the banking sector
in country i should, ceteris paribus, have a pos-
itive effect on the amount of loans flowing from
country i to country j or anywhere else.
Borrower model
LLP H 	 Higher loan loss provisions in country j should,
ceteris paribus, reduce the amount of loans from
country i as it indicates poor health of the bank-
ing sector in country j.
GBAL H ⊕ A higher government fiscal deficit in country j
(i.e. lower government balance) increases the
country’s riks profile and therefore it should, ce-
teris paribus, decrease the amount of loans from
country i to country j.
FDI H ⊕ A higher FDI to country j as an indicator of the
openness of its economy should, ceteris paribus,
increase the amount of loans flowing to country
j from country i.
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However, there is also one assumption which has been adopted from other
empirical works, such as Nikolov (2010), and will not be tested by any of our
models. It is the assumption that the changes in cross-border bank loans were
one of the mechanisms that helped to spread the 2007-09 crisis across the
CEE region. It was certainly not the only propagation mechanism, as the CEE
banks in general are not so much dependent on external financing compared to
the EU average. The main reason for that, especially in the Czech Republic,
Slovakia or Poland, is a rather low loan-to-deposit ratio which provides the
banks with enough internal funds so that they are not so much dependent
on financing from abroad. However, the cross-border loans still represent a
substantial source of funds for the CEE economies (especially in Hungary and
the Balkan countries) and their reduction may cause liquidity troubles to the
local banks and subsequently to the borrowers from non-financial sector. This
is the main reason why we have chosen to examine the cross-border bank loans
and their determinants in connection with the 2007-09 financial crisis. More
details on the banking sector characteristics of the CEE countries can be found
in Section 3.3.1.
4.3 Data Description
4.3.1 Cross-border Bank Loans
The data for the foreign bank loans have been taken from the BIS statistics.
It is a commonly used source of data for the empirical literature about cross-
border contagion, used for instance by Gersˇl (2007) or Van Rijckeghem & Weder
(2001). The BIS data are issued quarterly and include both stocks (“amounts
outstanding”) and flows (“changes”). Our explanatory variable is based on the
flow data, adjusted for exchange rate changes.
The BIS dataset is a consolidated banking statistics, in which creditor data
are reported on both the nationality (i.e. home country) and the residence (i.e.
host country) basis. In the first case, they are called consolidated statistics and
in their framework all bank loans from let us say Germany are consolidated on
a worldwide basis and reported as loans from German banks. In the second
case, in the locational statistics, all cross-border loans made by banks based in
Germany (including e.g. the Austrian banks) are reported as “German”, while
the loans from the Austrian banks’ subsidiaries in London are reported as the
UK loans. The main purpose of both data sets is to enable an analysis of the
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cross-border capital flows intermediated by the internationally active banks.
The locational data are more relevant for countries receiving external loans
(rather than giving the loans) because they measure lending flows in a given
period, consistent with the balance of payments data (“external positions”
correspond to the “other investment” category of capital flows).
It this thesis, we use the external loans of BIS reporting banks from source
countries vis-a`-vis individual host countries from the locational statistics. It
comprises data on gross international financial claims and liabilities of banks
resident in a given country, on banks and the non-bank sector in other coun-
tries. One of the main reasons for picking the locational statistics, besides
the consistency with the balance of payments data, is the focus on the CEE
region. We believe that distance-wise, it is more relevant to examine loans
from all international banks based in our source countries than to look at for
instance subsidiaries of French banks in South America. There, the probability
of lending to the CEE region would be rather limited.
4.3.2 Local Factors
The local factors in our empirical model are various macroeconomic, financial
and banking indicators and characteristics of both the borrowing (host) and
lending (source) countries. We started to build our model with a broad dataset
including about 20 variables and then step by step began to exclude the vari-
ables that were not significant or that were highly correlated with some others
(in that case we chose the more significant one).
The variables that were in the end chosen for our model are described in
Section 4.1. The other variables that we, for various reasons, excluded are
described in Table 4.2. The variables which were specific for source and host
countries were tested in both alternatives and if one of them was included in
our model, the excluded alternative is not stated in Table 4.2.
All the local factors which are supposed to describe the situation of banks in
host or source countries were taken from a database called Bankscope, released
by a business intelligence company Bureau van Dijk. It is a comprehensive
global database of banks’ financial statements, ratings and intelligence, covering
about 30,000 banks up to 16 years backwards. We requested the examined
ratios for all banks in our source and host countries and used a median for each
country as a variable in our model.
Another database which we used besides the commonly known Eurostat is
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Table 4.2: Excluded Variables
Variable Source Description
CB INT Eurostat, ECB central bank interest rate of host coun-
try j minus central bank interest rate of
source country i (%) - highly correlated
with MM INT
INFL IMF inflation of country j minus inflation of
country i (%)
FIN OPEN BIS, Eurostat ratio of external assets and liabilities of
BIS reporting banks in country j vis-
a`-vis country i relative to country j’s
GDP
BP S( H) Eurostat balance of payments of country i or j
which is net current + capital account
(credit - debit) as a percentage of GDP
- correlated with FDI S( H)
UNEM S( H) Eurostat, IMF unemployment rate of country i or j
(%)
ROAE S( H) Bankscope return on average equity of banks in
country i or j which is a measure of
profitability / return on shareholder
funds (%)
SOLV S( H) Bankscope ratio of equity to assets of banks in
country i or j which is a measure of
solvency (the amount of protection af-
forded to the bank by the equity they
invested in)
LIQ S( H) Bankscope deposit run off ratio of banks in coun-
try i or j which is a measure of what
percentage of customer and short term
funds could be met if they were with-
drawn suddenly
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the International Financial Statistics of the IMF. The database covers most IMF
members, as well as some non-members up to 1948. It shows major economic
aggregates used in the analysis of economic developments which together makes
approx. 32,000 time series for more than 200 countries. The data are available
in three freqencies: annual, quarterly, and monthly - from which we chose the
quarterly time series corresponding to our dependent variable.
Unfortunately, not all data used in our model are available in quarterly
frequency. In those cases we had to use yearly data and apply the same
value for all four periods in a year. Concretely, it is the case of the fol-
lowing variables: GBAL S( H), FDI S( H), LLP S( H), NIM S( H),
ROAE S( H), SOLV S( H), LIQ S( H). This approach should not have
any disturbing effect on the logic of our model besides a different variability of
the dependent and some explanatory variables.
4.3.3 Risk Appetite Index
One of the global factors used in our empirical research is the KP INDEX,
named after Kumar & Persaud (2002) whose calculation methods we use. The
index serves as a measure of investors’ risk appetite and indicates the level of
“pure” financial contagion which cannot be explained by changes of fundamen-
tals or by any direct linkages and spillovers between the affected countries. It
is important to note that the shift in investors’ risk appetite can be caused by
two different events:
• a shift in the overall degree of investors’ aversion or appetite to risk,
• a shift in the relative weight of different types of investors with different
risk appetites.
The first factor is rather intuitive to understand and can be caused for in-
stance by a series of negative returns on the financial markets. The second
factor could reflect for example the changing popularity of some risky instru-
ments or funds - hedge funds, emerging markets mutual funds etc.
The logic behind KP index calculation is based on the Capital Asset Pricing
Model (CAPM) where the assumption of a single risk-free rate rate at which all
investors can infinitely borrow and lend is removed and the assumption that all
investors have the same changing risk appetite is added. Then the composition
of the equilibrium market portfolio can change with altering risk aversion.
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The two basic concepts that need to be distinguished in the CAPM model are
the level of risk and the real risk appetite. If the level of risk changes (Figure
4.1), the whole efficiency frontier shifts but the slope of the capital market line
stays the same. Therefore the market portfolio’s composition remains static
and there is no systematic relationship between price impact (where price is
the expected rate of return) and asset risk (volatility). On the other hand, if
the risk appetite changes (Figure 4.2), the efficiency frontier stays the same but
the capital market line changes its slope as the investors change the weights
of risky and safe assets. Therefore there is a systematic relationship between
price impact and asset risk.
Figure 4.1: CAPM: Shift of Level of Risk
Source: Kumar & Persaud (2002), pg. 411.
To be able to distinguish between the changes in risk appetite and level of
risk when observing asset price changes, it is necessary to look at the order of
returns for any given asset. When risk changes at period t, the order of price
movements is the order of the impact of the current change in risk. Therefore
there should be weak correlation between price movements at t and a measure
of riskiness at t - k. Contrary to that, when appetite for risk changes, the order
of price changes follows the order of past riskiness. Therefore there should be
strong correlation between price movements att and a measure of riskiness at
t - k.
For the purposes of this thesis, the calculations are based on daily spot
and three-month forward exchange rates against euro of 11 currencies which
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Figure 4.2: CAPM: Shift of Risk Appetite
Source: Kumar & Persaud (2002), pg. 410.
are realatively liquid, and where the forward exchange rate is not impeded by
capital controls (all data have been downloaded from Bloomberg):
• Australian dollar
• Canadian dollar
• Czech koruna
• Hong Kong dollar
• Japanese yen
• New Zealand dollar
• Norwegian crown
• Singaporean dollar
• South African rand
• Swedish crown
• British pound
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The index calculation can be divided into 3 basic steps:
1. Calculating the current rank of excess returns (asset prices) by taking
the log difference of the spot rate and the three-month forward rate
determined three months ago (65 business days). If the spot rate has
outperformed the forward rate, there is an excess return.
2. Calculating the past rank of risk by taking the average volatility of quar-
terly excess returns over a one year period (260 business days). The
period over which the volatility of returns is measured and over which
the returns are measured must not overlap. Therefore the 260 business
days over which the volatility is calculated have to finish 66 business days
before the date of the spot rate.
3. Obtaining the KP index by calculating the Pearson’s correlation of the
current rank of excess returns and the past rank of risk. If the correlation
is positive, the investors increase their risk appetite. If the correlation is
negative, the investors become more risk averse. The more significant the
correlation (approaching 1 or -1), the stronger the change of investors’
risk appetite.
The outcome of the above described calculations are daily measures of in-
vestors’ risk appetite from 1 January 2001 to 31 December 2009. In order to
match the frequency of our dependent variable, we have calcualted quarterly
averages of the index.
The results of our calculations are presented in Figure 4.3. We can see
that the index is very volatile as it is calculated on a daily basis. When trying
to analyze investors’ risk appetite/aversion during the 2007-09 crisis, attention
needs to be paid to some visible peaks and bottoms. There is a very long period
of risk appetite during most of the year 2006 before the crisis had started. After
that in 2007, the values oscillate mostly below 0, indicating prevailing investors’
risk aversion due to the burst of the housing bubble in the US. Then at the
beginning of 2008, investors start to gain confidence in the markets again but
the mid-2008 and the fall of Lehman Brothers bring their risk appetite to an
almost historical minimum. The situation gets better during 2009 but there
are still more negative than positive values of the risk appetite index.
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Figure 4.3: Risk Appetite Index (2001-09)
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Source: author’s computations.
4.3.4 Volatility
The second global factor in our model is a variable called V OLATILITY .
It is the Chicago Board Options Exchange S&P 100 Volatility Index and its
use is inspired by Herrmann & Mihaljek (2010). It serves as an indicator of
the expected short-term volatility of the global financial market, based on the
weighted average of implied volatilities for a wide range of strikes. For our pur-
poses it approximates the level of risk on the global market which supplements
very well the KP INDEX. In this way we have both the level of risk and the
risk appetite as factors that may influence the flow of cross-border bank loans.
The V OLATILITY index has been downloaded from Bloomberg.
4.4 Estimation Results
The basic parameters of our model are described in Section 4.1. The data are
analyzed as panel data that pool together time series of cross-sections. Each
section represents one pair of host and source countries which makes 40 sections
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in total, observed over time t (t = 1, . . . , 36). All estimations and tests of our
data sample have been conducted in the econometrics software Gretl 1.9.3.
In a general matrix form, our panel data model (in any of its specifications)
can be described by Equation 4.5:
y = αιNT +Xβ + Zµµ+ ν = Zδ + Zµµ+ ν (4.5)
where y is of dimension NT ×1, ιNT is a vector of ones of dimension NT , Z
is NT ×(K+1) and Zµ is NT ×N . Zµ is a selector matrix of ones and zeros, or
simply the matrix of individual dummies that one may include in the regression
to estimate the µi’s (time-invariant cross-section specific components) if they
are assumed to be fixed parameters. N is the number of cross-sections, T is
the number of time periods, and K is the number of explanatory variables.
4.4.1 Chow Test of Poolability
At first, it is necessary to find out whether our assumption of the data poolabil-
ity is correct because otherwise each section (a pair of host and source countries)
would have to be examined separately. For this purpose we use the Chow test
of poolability which tests the stability of coefficients across sections. The Chow
test has two main versions based on Equation 4.5:
1. H0 : δi = δ for all i against HA : δi 6= δ at least for some i where
i = 1, . . . , N .
Test statistics is an F-test which is F(N−1)(K+1),N(T−K−1) distributed.
2. H0 : βi = β for all i against HA : βi 6= β at least for some i.
Test statistics is an F-test which is FK(N−1),N(T−K−1) distributed.
When we test the first version on our Basic model, we get the result that
p-value = 3.65682e− 008. The null hypothesis is strongly rejected which tells
us that all three coefficients (including intercept) are not stable across sections.
However, this does not mean that the data cannot be pooled together - in case
the weaker version of Chow test does not reject the null hypothesis.
The results of the second Chow test version on all model specifications are
summarized in Table 4.3 and the null hypothesis cannot be rejected on 10%
significance level for any of the cases. This tells us that all coefficients except
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the intercept are stable across sections and we can therefore use the panel data
approach - if controlled for section-specific fixed effects.
Table 4.3: Chow Test Results
Model p-value H0
Basic model 0.220635 confirmed
Global model 0.673328 confirmed
Lender model 0.148259 confirmed
Borrower model 0.213310 confirmed
Source: author’s computations.
4.4.2 Choosing the Right Estimator
The Chow test results might suggest that a fixed efects estimator would be the
best solution for our model, however we are going to examine all possibilities
as there are more factors that need to be considered. The estimation methods
that can be applied on panel data are
1. Pooled OLS estimator
2. Fixed effects estimator (within estimator)
3. Between estimator
4. Random effects estimator (GLS)
For the decision about wich one of these methods to use, we run the esti-
mations on our Basic model.
The pooled OLS estimator does not consider the µi’s to be fixed parame-
ters and thus Zµµ+ν may be simply rewritten as u where uit ∼ IID(0, σ2ν). In
other words, there are no cross-section specific µi’s that would add up with the
“universal” intercept and create cross-section specific intercepts. The pooled
OLS estimation results can be found in Table 4.4. GROWTH is significant on
1% significance level and MM INT turns out to be insignificant even on 10%
level. In order to judge the suitability of this estimation method, we need to
know the results of a test for fixed effects which is part of Gretl outcome for
the fixed effects estimator.
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Table 4.4: Pooled OLS Estimator
Pooled OLS, using 1440 observations
Included 40 cross-sectional units
Time-series length = 36
Dependent variable: l LOANS
Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const 0.561677 0.108134 5.1943 0.0000
GROWTH 0.0671632 0.0195443 3.4365 0.0006
MM INT −0.0147783 0.00994534 −1.4860 0.1375
Mean dependent var 0.655001 S.D. dependent var 1.843261
Sum squared resid 4829.708 S.E. of regression 1.833294
R2 0.012161 Adjusted R2 0.010786
F (2, 1437) 8.844919 P-value(F ) 0.000152
Log-likelihood −2914.574 Akaike criterion 5835.149
Schwarz criterion 5850.966 Hannan–Quinn 5841.053
ρˆ 0.049746 Durbin–Watson 1.845816
Source: author’s computations.
The fixed effects (within) estimator considers the µi’s to be fixed pa-
rameters which implies that the intercept is specific for each section. The model
can be rewritten as
yit = α +X
′
itβ +
N∑
i=1
µiDi + νit (4.6)
where Di is a dummy variable for the i-th section,
∑N
i=1 µi = 0 and uit ∼
IID(0, σ2ν). The fixed effects estimation results are presented in Table 4.5.
Both GROWTH and MM INT are significant on 1% significance level.
The test for fixed effects has the following null hypothesis
H0 : µ1 = µ2 = . . . = µN−1 = 0.
Test statistics is an F-test which is F(N−1),N(T−1)−K distributed. Its result
for the Basic model can be found in Table 4.5 where it is called “test for differing
group intercepts”. The p-value = 2.36421e-012 so the null hypothesis can be
rejected on 1% significance level and it confirms that the intercept is not the
same for each section.
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The within estimator builds on the information that is reflected in the time
series changes within the subjects/sections - the so-called “within variation”.
On the other hand, the between estimator builds on the information that
is reflected in the changes between subjects in a specific time period - the so-
called “between variation”. The between estimator can be obtained by running
OLS on the model in (4.5), premultiplied by P . P is a matrix which averages
the observation across time for each section and can be described as P =
Zµ(Z
′
µZµ)
−1Z ′µ, the projection matrix on Zµ. The between estimation results
are presented in Table 4.6. GROWTH is not significant and MM INT is
significant only on 10% significance level.
Table 4.5: Fixed Effects (Within) Estimator
Fixed-effects, using 1440 observations
Included 40 cross-sectional units
Time-series length = 36
Dependent variable: l LOANS
Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const 0.649038 0.0573322 11.3207 0.0000
GROWTH 0.0664261 0.0178934 3.7123 0.0002
MM INT −0.0396325 0.0115318 −3.4368 0.0006
Mean dependent var 0.655001 S.D. dependent var 1.843261
Sum squared resid 4393.608 S.E. of regression 1.772789
R2 0.101358 Adjusted R2 0.075003
F (41, 1398) 3.845866 P-value(F ) 1.41e–14
Log-likelihood −2846.437 Akaike criterion 5776.874
Schwarz criterion 5998.315 Hannan–Quinn 5859.537
ρˆ −0.052933 Durbin–Watson 2.029193
Test for differing group intercepts –
Null hypothesis: The groups have a common intercept
Test statistic: F (39, 1398) = 3.55801
with p-value = P (F (39, 1398) > 3.55801) = 2.36421e-012
Source: author’s computations.
The random effects estimator is a matrix-weighted average of the within
and between estimators, weighting each estimate by the inverse of its corre-
sponding variance. Compared to that, the pooled OLS estimator gives equal
weight to the between and within variations. In the random effects model, the
µi’s are assumed random and thus µi ∼ IID(0, σ2µ), νit ∼ IID(0, σ2ν) and the
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Table 4.6: Between Estimator
Between-groups, using 40 observations
Dependent variable: l LOANS
Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const 0.723165 0.158469 4.5635 0.0001
GROWTH −0.130267 0.0973305 −1.3384 0.1889
MM INT 0.0613601 0.0338831 1.8109 0.0783
Mean dependent var 0.655001 S.D. dependent var 0.536779
Sum squared resid 10.31260 S.E. of regression 0.527938
R2 0.082276 Adjusted R2 0.032669
F (2, 37) 1.658564 P-value(F ) 0.204256
Log-likelihood −29.64727 Akaike criterion 65.29455
Schwarz criterion 70.36118 Hannan–Quinn 67.12648
Source: author’s computations.
µi’s are independent of the νit’s. In addition, the Xit’s are independent of the
µi’s and νit’s for all i and t. The random effects estimator is a Generalized
Least Squares (GLS) estimator of the regression coefficients and its results can
be found in Table 4.7. Gretl uses the Swamy-Arora method to estimate the
Ω matrix. GROWTH is significant on 1% significance level and MM INT is
significant on 5% significance level.
The Gretl outcome for the random effects estimators (Table 4.7) includes
also two complementary tests - a Breusch-Pagan test and a Hausman test. The
Breusch-Pagan test basically compares the GLS and pooled OLS estimators
with a null hypothesis that the unit-specific error equals to zero
H0 : σ
2
µ = 0.
It is a Lagrange Multiplier test which is distributed as χ21. The p-value =
1.42083e-022 so the null hypothesis is strongly rejected. This result implies
that the random effects estimator (GLS) is not better than the pooled OLS one.
The Hausman test has a null hypothesis
H0 : E(uit/Xit) = 0
and the test statistics is distributed as χ2K . If the null hypothesis is rejected,
the GLS estimator will be biased and inconsistent while the within estimator
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stays unbiased and consistent. The test p-value = 0.019800 so the null hy-
pothesis cannot be rejected even on 10% significance level. Therefore the GLS
estimator is at least as good as the within estimator.
Table 4.7: Random Effects Estimator
Random-effects (GLS), using 1440 observations
Included 40 cross-sectional units
Time-series length = 36
Dependent variable: l LOANS
Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const 0.597076 0.0989893 6.0317 0.0000
GROWTH 0.0704776 0.0172045 4.0965 0.0000
MM INT −0.0270989 0.0105271 −2.5742 0.0101
Mean dependent var 0.655001 S.D. dependent var 1.843261
Sum squared resid 4836.419 S.E. of regression 1.833929
Log-likelihood −2915.574 Akaike criterion 5837.148
Schwarz criterion 5852.965 Hannan–Quinn 5843.053
σˆ2ε = 3.14278
σˆ2u = 0.278719
θ = 0.440342
Breusch-Pagan test –
Null hypothesis: Variance of the unit-specific error = 0
Asymptotic test statistic: χ2(1) = 95.5793
with p-value = 1.42083e-022
Hausman test –
Null hypothesis: GLS estimates are consistent
Asymptotic test statistic: χ2(2) = 7.84408
with p-value = 0.0198006
Source: author’s computations.
In order to decide which estimator is the best one to use, it is necessary
to summarize the results of the four possible models and the complementary
tests. Both the Chow test and the test for fixed effects suggest that there are
different intercepts across sections. Together with the fact that the pooled OLS
and the between estimators assign a rather low significance to our explana-
tory variables, the results so far speak in favour of the within estimator. The
Breusch-Pagan test suggests that the random effects estimator is not better
than the pooled OLS, however the Hausman test does not reject the consis-
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tency and unbiasedness of the GLS estimator. Considering all these results and
the fact that not only the statistics, but also pure logic speak in favour of the
fixed effects across countries (a small set of examined units), we decided to use
the fixed effects (within) estimator.
The fixed effects model assumes homoscedasticity within each section and
across sections and Gretl calculates error terms robust to this assumption. The
relatively low R2 is not unusual for larger panel data sets and is also given by the
fact that we are trying to explain quarterly data which are extremely volatile
and often switch the sign or equal to zero. Neither of the estimation methods
lead to normally distributed residuals and therefore this characteristics did not
play any role in our estimation method decision. However, it should be taken
into account when interpreting the results of the final model because it worsens
its reliability. Additional robustness checks can be found in Section 4.5.
4.4.3 Results Interpretation
After choosing the right estimator for our model, this section iterprets the
estimation results for the Basic model and its three specifications. But before
going into more details, there is one general characteristic of the model worth
noting - the cross-section specific fixed effects. This information tells us that
even if our dataset reacts identically to changes of explanatory variables, each
pair of source and host countries is unique in their intercept. In this case, the
intercept might be interpreted as the average level of cross-border bank loans
from the source to the host country. The CEE is a rather homogenous region
but there are for sure differences in the amounts of cross-border loans flowing
within each pair of countries, depending on their size, institutional relations,
size of banking sectors etc.
1. Basic model
The Basic model results are presented in Table 4.5 and both explana-
tory variables are significant on 1% significance level. The GROWTH
coefficient equals to 0.066 which confirms our hypothesis that a higher
GDP growth of host country j relative to source country i increases the
amount of cross-border loans from banks in country i to all sectors in
country j. On the other hand, the MM INT coefficient has a negative
sign (-0.040) which implies that a higher money market interest rate in
country j relative to country i reduces the amount of cross-border bank
loans between them.
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This finding is rather surprising and goes against our original hypothesis.
We expected that the banks in source countries would be motivated by
higher interest rates in host countries which generally reflect in higher
relative yields from the loans provided. But it seems that this motivation
has been offset by some other factors. A high interest rate is often char-
acteristic for less mature financial markets and this interpretation might
play its role also in the decision of the banks in our source countries.
Considering the remaining perception of the CEE countries as a relatively
risky region, the higher interest rates might be taken as a sign of certain
underdevelopments on their financial markets and discourage the foreign
banks from lending to them. Therefore the reverse relationship between
the interest rate differential and cross-border loans.
2. Global model
Table 4.8: Global Model
Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const 1.95372 0.350788 5.5695 0.0000
GROWTH 0.0561885 0.0176749 3.1790 0.0015
MM INT −0.0266712 0.0120764 −2.2085 0.0274
l VOLATILITY −1.02908 0.264581 −3.8895 0.0001
KP INDEX 0.615255 0.251918 2.4423 0.0147
Mean dependent var 0.655001 S.D. dependent var 1.843261
Sum squared resid 4342.279 S.E. of regression 1.763665
R2 0.111856 Adjusted R2 0.084500
F (43, 1396) 4.088788 P-value(F ) 1.10e–16
Log-likelihood −2837.976 Akaike criterion 5763.952
Schwarz criterion 5995.937 Hannan–Quinn 5850.552
ρˆ −0.061235 Durbin–Watson 2.047046
Test for differing group intercepts –
Null hypothesis: The groups have a common intercept
Test statistic: F (39, 1396) = 3.47887
with p-value = P (F (39, 1396) > 3.47887) = 6.66517e-012
Source: author’s computations.
The Global model is supposed to find out to what extent are cross-
border loans influenced by global factors - in our case global risk aversion
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(KP INDEX) and expected volatility (l V OLATILITY ). Its estima-
tion results are presented in Table 4.8. The l V OLATILITY coefficient
equals to -1.029 and is significant on 1% level. The negative sign con-
firms our hypothesis that higher expected volatility on the global financial
markets signals a higher level of overall risk and reduces the amount of
cross-border loans from country i to country j.
The KP INDEX coefficient equals to 0.615 and is significant on 5%
level. Its positive sign confirms our hypothesis that the CEE countries are
still considered a relatively risky region and that the global changes in
investors’ risk appetite influence the amount of bank loans flowing to them
from more developed countries. When investors’ risk appetite increases
(KP INDEX > 0), they shift their portfolios towards more risky assets,
including claims on banking and non-banking sector in the CEE countries.
On the contrary, if investors’ risk aversion increases (KP INDEX < 0),
they shift their portfolios towards safer assets and reduce their exposure
towards the CEE region.
3. Lender model
The Lender model corresponds to the idea that local factors in source
countries have major influence on the loans coming from these countries to
the CEE region. Out of many tested macroeconomic fundamentals, char-
acteristics of the banking sector and other factors, two variables showed
the most influence - loan loss provisions (LLP S) and net interest margin
(NIM S). The estimation results are presented in Table 4.9.
The LLP S coefficient equals to -0.028 and is significant on 5% level.
Its negative sign confirms our hypothesis that the average ratio of loan
loss provisions to net interest revenue of banks in source countries has
a negative influence on loans to host countries. If the banks are in bad
shape and coping with liquidity troubles, they do not have enough means
to lend money to other foreign banks. And during the 2007-09 crisis, the
banks in Western Europe were hit by the credit crunch and increasing
amount of defaulting loans which reduced the cross-border loans to CEE
countries.
The NIM S coefficient equals to 0.728 and is significant on 1% level
which gives it a higher importance than to the loan loss provisions ratio.
Its sign corresponds to our hypothesis that higher profitability of banks
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in source countries leads to higher loans to host countries. The relation-
ship, however, also works vice-versa so when the profitability of most
banks during the 2007-09 crisis decreased, they had to cut their lending
including the loans to CEE countries.
Table 4.9: Lender Model
Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const −0.522259 0.504705 −1.0348 0.3010
GROWTH 0.0478612 0.0175147 2.7326 0.0064
MM INT −0.0302982 0.0111940 −2.7067 0.0069
LLP S −0.0278516 0.0126533 −2.2011 0.0279
NIM S 0.728035 0.204487 3.5603 0.0004
Mean dependent var 0.655001 S.D. dependent var 1.843261
Sum squared resid 4295.275 S.E. of regression 1.754094
R2 0.121470 Adjusted R2 0.094410
F (43, 1396) 4.488806 P-value(F ) 2.92e–19
Log-likelihood −2830.140 Akaike criterion 5748.279
Schwarz criterion 5980.265 Hannan–Quinn 5834.879
ρˆ −0.073123 Durbin–Watson 2.072346
Test for differing group intercepts –
Null hypothesis: The groups have a common intercept
Test statistic: F (39, 1396) = 4.20155
with p-value = P (F (39, 1396) > 4.20155) = 4.37069e-016
Source: author’s computations.
4. Borrower model
The Borrower model examines to what extent the local factors in host
countries influence cross-border loans they receive from source countries.
The factors that in the end turned out significant are incoming foreign
direct investment (FDI H), loan loss provisions of the banking sector
(LLP H), and government balance (GBAL H). The estimation results
are presented in Table 4.10.
The FDI H coefficient equals to 0.017 and is significant on 5% level.
It confirms our hypothesis that a greater openness of the host economy
increases the amount of cross-border loans flowing to the country. On the
other hand, it is quite a common effect in periods of crisis that countries
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tend to close up and cut the linkages to other economies. In that case
the relationship works at a disadvantage for the host countries and as
the amount of their FDI decreases, the cross-border loans from source
countries are cut correspondingly.
Table 4.10: Borrower Model
Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const 1.23062 0.138669 8.8746 0.0000
GROWTH 0.0372643 0.0177287 2.1019 0.0357
MM INT −0.0354144 0.0124086 −2.8540 0.0044
FDI H 0.0172770 0.00703901 2.4545 0.0142
LLP H −0.0163966 0.00574287 −2.8551 0.0044
GBAL H 0.131258 0.0310373 4.2290 0.0000
Mean dependent var 0.655001 S.D. dependent var 1.843261
Sum squared resid 4238.313 S.E. of regression 1.743048
R2 0.133121 Adjusted R2 0.105779
F (44, 1395) 4.868664 P-value(F ) 3.78e–22
Log-likelihood −2820.527 Akaike criterion 5731.055
Schwarz criterion 5968.313 Hannan–Quinn 5819.623
ρˆ −0.087799 Durbin–Watson 2.102410
Test for differing group intercepts –
Null hypothesis: The groups have a common intercept
Test statistic: F (39, 1395) = 4.49401
with p-value = P (F (39, 1395) > 4.49401) = 8.07653e-018
Source: author’s computations.
The LLP H coefficient equals to -0.016 and is significant on 1% level. Sim-
ilarly to the Lender model, a deteriorating banking health in a source country
reduces the amount of cross-border loans it receives. It increases the country’s
risk profile and the international investors rather invest in other countries with
a lower default probability.
The GBAL H coefficient equals to 0.131 and according to its p-value, it
turns out to be the most significant coefficient in the Borrower model. Its
sign confirms that a larger fiscal deficit of a host country reduces the amount
of received cross-border loans. This is due to a deteriorated risk profile of
the country arising from a larger probability of future default on public debt.
During the 2007-09 crisis, most European governments had to boost their econ-
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omies or bail out some troubled enterprises that were too big to fail. These
actions of course costed a lot of money and significantly increased public debt
which negatively influenced the willingness of foreign banks to lend money to
these countries. In general, countries with the largest fiscal deficits were the
most hit by cuts in cross-border loans.
4.5 Robustness Checks
In order to analyze the data set in more detail, several robustness checks have
been carried out. The estimation results are examined under changing char-
acteristics of the model. To be more specific, two main areas are being paid
attention to - (1) the geographical location of the host countries and from that
arising regional characteristics and (2) the specifics of cross-border lending dur-
ing the 2007-09 crisis. The estimation results are presented in Sections 4.5.1
and 4.5.2. However, it has to be taken into account that the data sample is
not very extensive in its original form and when divided in smaller groups for
the robustness checks, the smaller size can have negative influence on the char-
acteristics of the model and information capability of the estimation results.
Therefore main focus should be placed on the overall test results and this sec-
tion should be taken only as additional information. We use the same fixed
effects model with error terms robust to homoscedasticity as for the original
model.
Besides the regional and time robustness checks, we have also tried the
dependence on lagged variables. Dependent and explanatory variables up until
three periods backwards were involved in the model with all its specifications.
However, the lagged variables did not show any significance compared to the
current ones which speaks in favour of the original model.
4.5.1 Regional Characteristics
The idea behind this robustness check is the diversity of the CEE region. It
reaches from the Central European countries which are very close to their
Western European neighbours to the Balkan countries further in the East.
Each of these countries certainly has its special characteristics (which has been
also confirmed by the main estimation results), however we think that the
CEE region can be divided in two main sub-regions of countries with very
similar local particularities. It is (1) the Viszegrad countries, namely the Czech
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Republic, Slovakia, Poland and Hungary, and (2) the Balkan states, namely
Slovenia, Croatia, Bulgaria and Romania. The countries in one sub-region
share similar history, cultural background and other characteristics which all
form investors’ opinion about it and which may lead to similar investment
decisions regarding all the members.
1. Viszegrad countries
The Viszegrad countries all lie in the heart of Europe and as such have
been probably more influenced by the Western Europe throughout the
history than the Balkan countries. They all joined the EU in 2004 and
Slovakia adopted euro on 1 January 2009. When considering some ba-
sic macroeconomic fundamentals and institutional characteristics (more
details on that can be found in Chapter 3), they are perceived as more
developed compared to the other sub-region. The results of the estima-
tion of all the four models for the Viszegrad countries are presented in
Table 4.11.
Signs of all estimation coefficients remain the same as in the main model
so the economic logic holds. However, the significance of some variables
has changed and some of them are not significant even on 10% level.
The most significant in all model specifications is the interest rate dif-
ferential (MM INT ), always on 1% significance level. On the contrary,
GROWTH loses its significance and in the Lender model it is not signif-
icant at all. The reason behind these changes might be the relatively fast
development of the Viszegrad countries during the 1990s so that their
economic and social level is now not so far from the source countries.
Therefore the lending countries probably do not pay so much attention
to the GDP growth differential as a sign of development when deciding
whether to invest in them or not.
Also the significance of the global factors decreased substantially and they
would both be significant only on 15% level. The explanation might be
that when the source and host countries are so close as the Viszegrad and
the surrounding countries, the source countries pay much less attention
to the global factors. They have very good local knowledge of the host
countries and thus their investment decisions cannot be so easily influ-
enced by the volatility on global financial markets or change in their risk
aversion.
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In the Lender model, LLP S has the same significance as in the main
model (5%) but NIM S does not turn out significant. This suggests
that cross-border loans to Viszegrad countries are sensitive to changes
in bank health in the source countries but changes in the the banks’
profitability are balanced through some other channels. In the Borrower
model, the only significant additional factor is FDI H which suggests
that the source banks probably do not pay that much attention to the
risk factors of the host countries.
2. Balkan countries
The Balkan countries are not such a homogenous region as the Viszegrad
countries. Slovenia, the most developed country of the region, has been
a member of the EU since 2004 and adopted euro in 2007. Romania and
Bulgaria joined the EU in 2007 during the last enlargement and Croatia
has been negotiating its acceptance since 2003. However, Croatia’s GDP
per capita is approx. double the GDP per capita of Bulgaria or Romania
which are the poorest countries of the EU. The results of the estimation
of all the four models for the Balkan states are presented in Table 4.12.
The significance of the estimation coefficients has, similarly to the other
region specification, changed. In terms of the Basic model, GROWTH
turns out to be more significant than MM INT which is in contrast
to the Viszegrad countries. The overall economic growth of the Balkan
countries, less developed than the Viszegrad region, seems to be more im-
portant for cross-border loans than the maturity of their financial sector.
l V OLATILITY is highly significant which suggests that the flow of
cross-border loans to the Balkan countries is more influenced by the
global factors, probably due to their larger distance from the source coun-
tries. The distance might have influenced also the significance of factors
connected to the potential riskiness of the host countries - LLP H and
GBAL H in the Borrower model. They take over all the significance of
FDI H which is exactly the opposite situation then by the Viszegrad
countries. The estimation results are converse also in the Lender model
with NIM S highly significant and LLP S not significant at all. The
logic behind this might be that the higher distance and potential riski-
ness of the Balkan countries make them candidates for cross-border loans
only if the banks’ profitability rises substantially and if the source banks’
profitability decreases, their loans are the first to be cut.
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Table 4.11: Viszegrad Countries
Fixed-effects, using 720 observations
Included 20 cross-sectional units
Time-series length = 36
Dependent variable: l LOANS
Basic model
Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const 0.869249 0.102108 8.5131 0.0000
GROWTH 0.0569726 0.0329119 1.7311 0.0839
MM INT −0.121982 0.0311119 −3.9208 0.0001
Global model
Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const 1.29063 0.311221 4.1470 0.0000
GROWTH 0.0592943 0.0284840 2.0817 0.0377
MM INT −0.0966560 0.0321123 −3.0099 0.0027
l VOLATILITY −0.388945 0.265743 −1.4636 0.1438
KP INDEX 0.616802 0.419665 1.4697 0.1421
Lender model
Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const 0.937324 0.599354 1.5639 0.1183
GROWTH 0.0354943 0.0313859 1.1309 0.2585
MM INT −0.102459 0.0279301 −3.6684 0.0003
LLP S −0.0446999 0.0192252 −2.3251 0.0204
NIM S 0.234674 0.243544 0.9636 0.3356
Borrower model
Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const 0.605278 0.213832 2.8306 0.0048
GROWTH 0.0549451 0.0316600 1.7355 0.0831
MM INT −0.101380 0.0286806 −3.5348 0.0004
FDI H 0.0159155 0.00742586 2.1433 0.0324
BP H −0.0377994 0.0364931 −1.0358 0.3007
LLP H −0.00615233 0.00720562 −0.8538 0.3935
Source: author’s computations.
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Table 4.12: Balkan Countries
Fixed-effects, using 720 observations
Included 20 cross-sectional units
Time-series length = 36
Dependent variable: l LOANS
Basic model
Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const 0.599831 0.0803591 7.4644 0.0000
GROWTH 0.0727637 0.0214630 3.3902 0.0007
MM INT −0.0259384 0.0116883 −2.2192 0.0268
Global model
Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const 2.64745 0.580114 4.5637 0.0000
GROWTH 0.0560231 0.0231363 2.4214 0.0157
MM INT −0.0155876 0.0124474 −1.2523 0.2109
l VOLATILITY −1.57936 0.422052 −3.7421 0.0002
KP INDEX 0.348800 0.294686 1.1836 0.2370
Lender model
Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const −1.73573 0.641194 −2.7070 0.0070
GROWTH 0.0551158 0.0216975 2.5402 0.0113
MM INT −0.0178994 0.0109260 −1.6382 0.1018
LLP S −0.00949461 0.0145881 −0.6508 0.5154
NIM S 1.16691 0.268920 4.3392 0.0000
Borrower model
Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const 1.12555 0.231308 4.8660 0.0000
GROWTH 0.0407130 0.0234806 1.7339 0.0834
MM INT −0.0323292 0.0149091 −2.1684 0.0305
FDI H 0.0165205 0.0183219 0.9017 0.3675
LLP H −0.0127602 0.00659570 −1.9346 0.0534
GBAL H 0.169437 0.0598030 2.8333 0.0047
Source: author’s computations.
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4.5.2 Crisis Period
The crisis period robustness check tests the original model with all its speci-
fications only for the years 2007, 2008 and 2009 (t = 25, . . . , 36) and it tries
to find out whether the relationships between the dependent and explanatory
variables hold. The estimation results are preseted in Table 4.13, however they
should be interpreted with caution as the crisis period is rather short and all
variables are more volatile than in normal times.
Starting with the Basic model, MM INT is much more significant in all
model specifications than GROWTH. This might be due to the fact that dur-
ing a financial crisis, financial market characteristics of host countries are more
important for the lending banks than the overall situation of the borrowing
economies. The interest rate also gives more specific information which is eas-
ily accessible and changes more frequently according to the current situation
on the financial markets.
The Global and Lender model specification coefficients do not show much
signs of significance but the results get better with the Borrower model. This
suggests that during the crisis period, the host country local factors are the
most important factors which influence the amount of cross-border bank loans.
To be more specific, it is the openness of the host economy (FDI H signifcant
on 5% level) and the potential riskiness arising from the size of public debt
(GBAL H significant on 1% level).
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Table 4.13: Crisis Period
Fixed-effects, using 480 observations
Included 40 cross-sectional units
Time-series length = 12
Dependent variable: l LOANS
Basic model
Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const 0.720620 0.133634 5.3925 0.0000
GROWTH 0.0928430 0.0392414 2.3659 0.0184
MM INT −0.111639 0.0378899 −2.9464 0.0034
Global model
Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const 2.13798 0.874514 2.4448 0.0149
GROWTH 0.0770442 0.0408010 1.8883 0.0597
MM INT −0.104101 0.0376292 −2.7665 0.0059
l VOLATILITY −0.993268 0.616777 −1.6104 0.1080
KP INDEX −0.165517 1.07495 −0.1540 0.8777
Lender model
Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const −1.91404 2.05996 −0.9292 0.3533
GROWTH 0.0493652 0.0396325 1.2456 0.2136
MM INT −0.0226538 0.0372380 −0.6084 0.5433
LLP S −0.0380271 0.0359761 −1.0570 0.2911
NIM S 1.51627 0.818236 1.8531 0.0645
Borrower model
Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const 1.64752 0.350447 4.7012 0.0000
GROWTH 0.0158182 0.0381381 0.4148 0.6785
MM INT 0.105585 0.0407172 2.5931 0.0098
FDI H 0.0412966 0.0199792 2.0670 0.0393
LLP H −0.0163208 0.0153558 −1.0628 0.2884
GBAL H 0.405880 0.0940006 4.3178 0.0000
Source: author’s computations.
Chapter 5
Conclusion
This thesis deals with the topic of cross-border contagion in times of financial
crises. The globalization of financial markets across the world which has hap-
pend during the past few decades has made it much easier for a financial crisis
to spread from one country to another. In order to control or at least be able to
predict the contagion effects, it is important to examine the times of financial
turmoil and focus on the propagation mechanisms and factors which make a
crisis expand across borders.
The main focus of this thesis was cross-border bank loans to CEE countries
- one of the contagion channels through which the 2007-09 crisis had affected
the region. We tried to discover which global and local factors had significant
influence on the changes in bank loans from banks in source countries to banks,
as well as households, corporations and government in host countries. The data
were analyzed as panel data that pool together time series of cross-sections,
each section representing one pair of host and source countries. The examined
time period was from 2001 to 2009 with quarterly frequency.
Out of all considered estimators, we have chosen the fixed effects (within)
estimator which considers the intercept to be specific for each section, i.e. for
each pair of source and host countries. This information tells us that even
if our dataset reacts identically to changes of explanatory variables, the aver-
age amount of funds flowing between each source and host country differs. It
is consistent with a commmon sense assumption that the level of changes in
cross-border loans should differ for instance in Poland and Croatia, even if the
changes depend on the same factors.
In order to capture all different kinds of effects that might have influenced
the cross-border bank flows in CEE during the 2007-09 crisis, we have created
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a basic model and three other extension models. Each of them tries to explain
different aspects of cross-border bank lending, looking at it from a different
point of view. The outcomes of the sub-models are summarized in the following
four paragraphs.
The Basic model revealed that a higher GDP growth of a host country rel-
ative to a source country increases the amount of cross-border loans. On the
other hand, a higher money market interest rate in a host country relative to
a source country reduces the amount of cross-border loans. This finding was
rather surprising and contradicted our original hypothesis. However, if we con-
sider the remaining perception of the CEE countries as a relatively risky region,
the higher interest rates might be taken as a sign of certain underdevelopments
in their financial markets and discourage the foreign banks from lending to
them. An important finding based on the omitted variables was that the dis-
tance between a source and a host country has no influence on the changes of
loans between them and thus an application of a gravity model would not make
any sense in this case.
The Global model showed evidence of global factors’ influence on interna-
tional bank lending to CEE countries. More concretely, higher expected short-
term volatility in the global financial markets which signals a higher level of
overall risk reduces the amount of cross-border loans to CEE. The same but less
significant effect is caused by increased investors’ risk aversion. This variable
controls for the pure contagion phenomenon and thus confirms that CEE is still
considered a relatively risky region from which funds should be withdrawn in
times of crises.
The Lender model examined effects of various source country specific factors
and found two of them significant. The average ratio of loan loss provisions
to net interest revenue of banks in source countries which is an estimator for
banks’ health (the higher, the less healthy) reduces loans to host countries. On
the other hand, source country’s banks’ profitability (the net interest margin)
raises the amount of cross-border loans. This relationship, however, also works
vice-versa so when the profitability of most banks during the 2007-09 crisis
decreased, they cut their lending including the loans to CEE.
Similarly to the Lender model, health of the banking sector was proven to
reduce cross-border loans also in the Borrower model - just regarding the host
country’s banks. Another host country specific factor that appeared significant
was the incoming FDI which was an estimate for the openness of the host
country’s economy and had a positive effect on cross-border loans. The most
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significant variable in this model specification was government balance which
proved that a large fiscal deficit of a host country reduces the amount of received
cross-border loans due to a deteriorated country’s risk profile.
A couple of robustness checks were conducted in order to see the model’s
behaviour in different time periods and for different regions within our data
sample. An interesting finding was that the GDP growth differential appeared
much less significant than the interest rate differential for the Viszegrad coun-
tries. The reason behind it might be the relatively fast development of the
Viszegrad countries during the 1990s so that their economic and social level
is now not so far from the source countries. Therefore the lending countries
probably do not pay so much attention to the GDP growth differential as a sign
of development when deciding whether to invest in them or not. The situation
was exactly the opposite for the less developed Balkan countries (GDP growth
differential was more significant) which supports our explanation.
Another interesting finding was that the global factors were much less signif-
icant for the Viszegrad countries than for the Balkan countries. This suggests
that the closer the host countries are to the source countries, the better knowl-
edge there is about the borrower and the less attention the lending banks pay
to the global factors. The crisis period robustness check assigned most sig-
nificance to the realtive interest rate differential and the host county specific
factors. This suggests that in times of crises, investors assign the most impor-
tance to the soundness of the financial market characteristics and risk profile
indicators of host countries.
This thesis proved that cross-border bank loans to CEE countries were in-
fluenced by both global and local factors and out of the local factors by both
source and host country specific ones. The confirmation of pure contagion ef-
fect implies that even if the policy makers take measures against spillovers via
local factors, they can never control the whole contagion process. The policy
measures which could possibly influence cross-border spillovers of a financial
crisis via country specific factors might be the subject of some further research.
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